University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

2020

Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims after Guilty Pleas
Colin Miller
University of South Carolina - Columbia, mille933@law.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims after Guilty Pleas, 10 UC Irvine L. Rev. 671
(2020).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Second to Printer_Miller (Do Not Delete)

2/26/2020 1:32 PM

Why States Must Consider Innocence
Claims After Guilty Pleas
Colin Miller*
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 672
I.
The History and Structure of Post-conviction DNA and Non-DNA
Actual Innocence Statutes ................................................................................ 674
A. Introduction ............................................................................................... 674
B. Post-conviction DNA Testing Statutes ................................................. 675
1. History .................................................................................................. 675
2. Statutory Requirements ..................................................................... 676
3. Guilty Pleas and Post-conviction DNA Testing ........................... 678
a. Statutes Explicitly Addressing Pleading Defendants ............ 678
b. Statutes Requiring that Identity was in Issue ......................... 679
c. Statutes Referencing a Trial ...................................................... 683
d. Statutes with No Reference to Trial or Identity .................... 686
C. Non-DNA Actual Innocence Statutes .................................................. 688
1. History .................................................................................................. 688
2. Statutory Requirements and Pleading Defendants ....................... 689
II.
Constitutional Challenges to Post-conviction DNA and Non-DNA
Actual Innocence Statutes ................................................................................ 692
A. Introduction ............................................................................................... 692
B. Substantive and Procedural Due Process Challenges ......................... 693
1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 693
2. Post-conviction DNA Statutes ........................................................ 693
3. Non-DNA/Actual Innocence Statutes .......................................... 698
C. Equal Protection Clause Challenges....................................................... 700
1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 700
2. Post-conviction DNA Statutes ........................................................ 700
3. Non-DNA/Actual Innocence Statutes .......................................... 702
D. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 703

* Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of South Carolina School of Law;
Blog Editor, Evidence Prof Blog: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/ [ https://
perma.cc/4KAG-HFK7 ]; Co-Host, Undisclosed Podcast: http://undisclosed-podcast.com/ [ https:/
/perma.cc/NA29-VKXN ].

671

Second to Printer_Miller (Do Not Delete)

672

2/26/2020 1:32 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:671

III.

The Right to Access the Courts ....................................................................... 703
A. Introduction ............................................................................................... 703
B. History of the Right to Access the Courts ............................................ 703
C. Halbert v. Michigan and Pleading vs. Non-Pleading Defendants..... 707
IV.
A Right to Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty ..................................... 709
A. Introduction ............................................................................................... 709
B. Establishing a Right to Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty ....... 709
C. Feasibility and Mechanics of a Right to Prove Innocence After
Pleading Guilty........................................................................................... 715
1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 715
a. Statutes and Case Law ............................................................... 716
b. Mechanics of a Right to Prove Innocence After
Pleading Guilty............................................................................ 716
c. Missouri v. Frye and Expanding Constitutional
Challenges to Guilty Pleas......................................................... 720
D. Reasoned Distinctions .............................................................................. 722
1. Possible Reasoned Distinctions in the Actual Innocence
Context ................................................................................................. 722
2. The Justifications for the Reasoned Distinctions in Halbert...... 723
3. Reasoned Distinctions Do Not Make Sense in the Actual
Innocence Context ............................................................................. 725
4. A Limitation and Possible New Dimension of a Right to
Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty ......................................... 726
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 727

INTRODUCTION
Natasha Tiger was the licensed practical nurse for a profoundly disabled ten
year-old girl who was admitted to the hospital with what appeared to be scald
burns.1 Believing that these “burns” were caused by a scalding bath that Tiger had
given the girl, a prosecutor charged Tiger with seven separate crimes.2 Based in part
on her inability to pay for medical experts, Tiger pleaded guilty to a single lesser
included offense pursuant to a plea agreement.3
When the girl’s parents later brought a civil action against Tiger, she retained
a physician who diagnosed the girl with toxic epidermal necrolysis (TEN), a
dermatological condition characterized by blistering of the skin as an adverse
reaction to medications.4 This diagnosis was corroborated by a biopsy, and it was
bolstered by the fact that the girl was taking antibiotic and anti-seizure medications

1.
2.
3.
4.

People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 515 (N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 512.
People v. Tiger, 149 A.D.3d 86, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).

Second to Printer_Miller (Do Not Delete)

2/26/2020 1:32 PM

2020] WHY STATES MUST CONSIDER INNOCENCE CLAIMS

673

at the time of her skin condition.5 The civil jury unanimously found that the care
rendered by Tiger was not a substantial factor in causing the girl’s injuries.6
Based on the physician’s affirmation and other evidence, Tiger moved to
vacate her conviction on grounds of actual innocence.7 In ultimately denying Tiger
relief on June 14, 2018, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that
freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence (1) can be
brought by defendants convicted after trials, but (2) cannot be brought by defendants
who pleaded guilty.8 Therefore, even if the justices were completely convinced of
Tiger’s innocence, they were powerless to vacate her conviction.9
Courts in other states have found that a similar dichotomy exists for
defendants seeking post-conviction DNA testing. For example, in 1996, Elwyn
Graham pleaded guilty to capital murder in Arkansas.10 He later filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, (1) claiming that he was mentally ill and that his plea was
coerced; and (2) seeking to have a hair recovered at the crime scene tested to obtain
a profile of the mitochondrial DNA contained in it.11 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas ultimately denied Graham relief, concluding that Arkansas’s
post-conviction DNA testing statute only covers defendants convicted after trials
and does not protect pleading defendants.12
The first DNA exoneree in this country was a man with a sub-70 IQ who
pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty,13 and 74 out of 166 (44.6%) DNA and
non-DNA exonerees in 2016 were individuals who had been convicted after guilty
pleas.14 Nonetheless, a number of states have interpreted their post-conviction
statutes to prohibit pleading defendants from (1) seeking DNA testing and/or
(2) presenting freestanding claims of actual innocence based upon non-DNA
evidence. Moreover, many other states could soon read the same pleading defendant
prohibitions into their post-conviction laws based upon similar statutory language.15
A handful of courts and commentators have argued that pleading defendants
should have a right to prove their innocence based on substantive due process.16
5.
Id. at 98–99.
6.
Tiger, 110 N.E.3d at 511–12.
7.
Id. at 512.
8.
Id. at 514.
9.
See id. at 522 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Natascha Tiger pleaded guilty but is innocent.”).
10. Graham v. State, 188 S.W.3d 893, 894 (Ark. 2004).
11. Id. at 895.
12. Id. at 895–96.
13. See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
14. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016, at 2 (2017),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/4NKJ-MSQG ] [ hereinafter EXONERATIONS IN 2016 ].
15. See infra Section I.B.3.C.
16. See, e.g., Daina Borteck, Note, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 C ARDOZO
L. R EV . 1429 (2004); Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of
Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 799 (2011);
Eunyung Theresa Oh, Note, Innocence After Guilt: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents Who Pled
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But these arguments have largely been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne that
there is no substantive due process right to post-conviction DNA testing.17
This Article advances a new theory for a right to prove innocence after
pleading guilty. Through a series of cases, the Supreme Court has created a right
known as the “right to access the courts” that is based on a combination of
procedural due process and equal protection concerns.18 A state violates this right
to access the courts by creating a right to appellate review but precluding certain
classes of defendants from having the actual or constructive ability to exercise that
right.19 Most notably, in Halbert v. Michigan, the Supreme Court found that Michigan
violated the right to access the courts by providing the right to appellate counsel to
defendants found guilty after trials but withholding that right from pleading
defendants.20 This Article contends that similar reasoning requires the recognition
of a right to access the courts for defendants who plead guilty and later seek to use
DNA or non-DNA evidence to prove their actual innocence.
Section I reviews the history and structure of post-conviction DNA and
non-DNA actual innocence statutes, paying particular attention to statutes with
pleading defendant prohibitions. Section II discusses the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause challenges brought by defendants unable to satisfy the statutory
requirements of these statutes and why neither Constitutional protection, by itself,
is likely to help most pleading defendants. Section III analyzes the history and
application of the right to access the courts, including the Supreme Court’s Halbert
opinion. Section IV argues that the right to access the courts can and should be
used to recognize a right to prove innocence after pleading guilty and details the
mechanics of how this right would work in practice.
I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF POST-CONVICTION DNA AND NON-DNA
ACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTES
A. Introduction
In recent years, every state has enacted a post-conviction DNA testing statute,
and many states have passed laws allowing defendants to bring freestanding claims
of actual innocence based upon non-DNA evidence. This Section focuses upon the
history and structure of these statutes, with particular focus on laws that distinguish
between pleading and non-pleading defendants.
Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161 (2004); Rebecca Stephens, Comment, Disparities in Postconviction
Remedies for Those Who Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and
Recommendations for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2013); cf. JH Dingfelder Stone,
Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded
Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47 (2010).
17. District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 54 (2009).
18. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996).
19. Id. at 371.
20. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 622–23 (2005).
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B. Post-conviction DNA Testing Statutes
1. History
In 1989, David Vasquez was the first person who proved his innocence
through post-conviction DNA testing.21 In 1984, Carolyn Jean Hamm had been
found raped and hanged in her Arlington, Virginia, home, with her hands bound
behind her with a Venetian blind cord.22 Detectives subsequently interrogated
Vasquez about the crime for hours.23 Vasquez, who had a sub-70 IQ, eventually
admitted to the crime, but he (1) initially said that he tied Hamm’s hands behind her
back with ropes, his belt, and a coat hanger before being told that they were bound
with a Venetian blind; and (2) initially said that he stabbed Hamm before being told
that she was hanged.24 After unsuccessfully claiming that his confession was
involuntary, Vasquez pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and burglary to avoid
the death penalty.25 Subsequent DNA testing established that Timothy Wilson
Spencer was guilty of a series of similar crimes that led to him being dubbed the
“Southside Strangler.”26 Based on the similar modus operandi of these crimes and
the likelihood that Spencer had killed Hamm, Virginia Governor Gerald L. Baliles
pardoned Vasquez on January 4, 1989.27
The Vasquez case signaled a sea change in wrongful conviction
jurisprudence.28 Previously, post-conviction law had been plagued by inertia, with
appellate courts gun-shy about granting relief based upon the unreliability of witness
recantations and a reluctance to disturb jury verdicts and guilty pleas.29 DNA testing
created the promise of objective, irrefutable evidence of innocence that could
disturb even convictions that had calcified over decades.30 Three years after the
founding of the Innocence Project,31 New York created the country’s first

21. Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty
Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199, 199 n.3 (2008).
22. See Jonah Horwitz & Rob Warden, David Vasquez, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3705 [ https://
perma.cc/76R8-P35J] ( last updated Mar. 11, 2014 ) [hereinafter Vasquez].
23. Id.
24. Id. “A sub-70 IQ score triggers a rebuttable presumption of intellectual disability.” Roberts
v. Colvin, No. CV616-098, 2017 WL 475698, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2017).
25. Vasquez, supra note 22.
26. Peter Baker, In Grim Distinction, Va. Killer Is First to Die Based on DNA Testing,
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 1994), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/
16/AR2010031602456.html [ https://perma.cc/6CSM-YBTU ].
27. Vasquez, supra note 22.
28. Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921 (2010).
29. Id.
30. Barry C. Scheck, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2001).
31. About Us, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ [ https://
perma.cc/C3LF-SCP3 ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ).
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post-conviction DNA testing statute in 1994.32 By 2004, thirty-one other states and
the federal government had passed similar statutes.33 Currently, every state has a
post-conviction DNA testing statute.34
2. Statutory Requirements
Generally speaking, these post-conviction DNA testing statutes allow
defendants to seek post-conviction DNA testing of evidence that could establish
their actual innocence. A representative example is Hawai’i’s post-conviction DNA
testing statute, which provides that:
[n]otwithstanding any other law or rule of court governing post-conviction
relief to the contrary, a person who was convicted of and sentenced for a
crime, or acquitted of a crime on the ground of physical or mental disease,
disorder, or defect excluding responsibility, may file a motion, at any time,
for DNA analysis of any evidence that:
(1) Is in the custody or control of a police department, prosecuting
attorney, laboratory, or court;
(2) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the
judgment of conviction or of acquittal of a crime on the ground of physical
or mental disease, disorder, or defect excluding responsibility; and
(3) May contain biological evidence.35
Hawai’i’s statute is possibly the most liberal post-conviction DNA testing
statute in the country. It contains (1) no statute of limitations; (2) no limitation on
the types of convictions that allow for testing; and (3) the lenient requirement that
the defendant must merely establish that the evidence to be tested is related to the
investigation or prosecution of the case. While many states similarly have no statute
of limitations for defendants seeking post-conviction DNA testing,36 other states
require defendants to seek testing within a certain number of years after their
convictions or the final judgments in their cases.37 For example, Minnesota’s statute

32. Nicholas Phillips, Note, Innocence and Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of Maryland’s
Postconviction DNA Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 65, 66 (2011).
33. Id.
34. See Theodore Tibbitts, Note, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: Why Massachusetts’s
278A Statute Should Be the Model for the Future, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 355, 374 n.185 (2016); Access
to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/accesspost-conviction-dna-testing/ [ https://perma.cc/8NZ2-TFFN ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 );
N AT ’ L C ONFERENCE OF STATE L EGISLATORS , POST C ONVICTION DNA T ESTING (2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/PostConvictionDNATesting.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3DEDQ3E9 ].
35. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 844D-121 (West 2019).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.73.010 (West 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405
(West 2018).
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2019) (within one year of conviction); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2019) (within three years of final judgment); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.4, 930.8 (2014) (within two years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 2136–2138 (2019) (within two years of conviction).
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only allows for a defendant to seek DNA testing within two years of his conviction
or the final judgment on his direct appeal.38
Like Hawai’i, many states allow defendants convicted of any crime to seek
post-conviction DNA testing.39 Other states only allow defendants convicted of
felony offenses to seek such testing.40 Some states are more restrictive still,
permitting DNA testing only for defendants convicted of certain types of felonies.41
Alabama is the most restrictive in this regard, possibly only allowing testing in
capital cases.42
Furthermore, while Hawai’i maintains a more lenient standard for
post-conviction DNA testing, most states apply one of three more stringent
standards of proof. Some states merely require a prima facie showing that the
evidence to be tested is material to the conviction or the issue of guilt.43 Other states
require the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the DNA testing
will establish his innocence,44 and some states even require clear and convincing
evidence.45
When post-conviction DNA testing produces a favorable result for a
defendant, states differ over the burden of proof required to order a new trial.
Texas’s statute asks the court to decide whether to grant a new trial based upon
post-conviction DNA testing by making “a finding as to whether, had the results
been available during the trial of the offense, it is reasonably probable that the
person would not have been convicted.”46 Meanwhile, Maryland’s statute states that
a new trial should be granted “on a finding that a substantial possibility exists that
38. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01–.06 (West 2019).
39. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901 (West 2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5
(West 2019).
40. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.4, 930.8 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 770.16 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-110, 53-1-214 (West 2019);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0918 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (West 2019); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71–.83 (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2019); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78B-9-301 to 304 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14(a) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-12-302 to -315 (West 2019).
41. ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (West 2019) (felony offenses against the person); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19 (West 2019) (certain felonies); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (West 2019)
(certain felonies); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2018) (certain felonies);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373 (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138.690 (West 2019);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-28-10 to -120 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-301 to -313 (West 2019);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 5561–5577 (West 2019).
42. ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2019). But see infra notes 376–84 and accompanying text.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2136–2138
(2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §770.16 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01 to .06 (West
2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-32.1-15(1)
(West 2019).
44. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.73.010 (West 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2019);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk (West 2019); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-4133 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 925.11, .12 (West 2019).
45. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-D:1 to D:4 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2019).
46. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.04 (West 2019).
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the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA testing results had been
known or introduced at trial.”47
3. Guilty Pleas and Post-conviction DNA Testing
a. Statutes Explicitly Addressing Pleading Defendants
Several states have post-conviction DNA statutes that explicitly allow for
pleading defendants to seek testing. California’s statute indicates that a DNA
petition will ordinarily be handled by “[t]he judge who conducted the trial, or
accepted the convicted person’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”48 Under Idaho’s
statute, “[a] petitioner who pleaded guilty in the underlying case may file a petition”
for DNA testing.49 Meanwhile, Mississippi’s law allows for post-conviction DNA
testing “even if the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere, or confessed or
admitted to a crime.”50
Using this statute, Bobby Ray Dixon and Phillip Bivens were able to seek
DNA testing despite pleading guilty to a murder and rape committed in Forrest
County, Mississippi, in 1979.51 DNA testing of semen left in the victim’s body was
a match for another man and excluded Dixon and Bivens. In December of 2010,
both men were officially exonerated.52
Ohio is the only state with a post-conviction DNA statute that explicitly
precludes all pleading defendants from seeking testing.53 Its statute provides that a
defendant is not eligible for post-conviction DNA testing “regarding any offense to
which the offender pleaded guilty or no contest.”54 In State v. Harris, Dwayne Harris
was charged with a kidnapping and rape in Cleveland, Ohio; he eventually accepted
a plea deal pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to rape in exchange for the
kidnapping charge being nolled.55 The plea was essentially an Alford plea,56 in which
a defendant legally pleads guilty but claims he is factually innocent:

47. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(2)(iii) (West 2019).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(f) (West 2019); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14(e) (West
2019) (“The motion shall be heard by the judge who conducted the trial or accepted the convicted
person’s plea, unless the presiding judge determines that judge is unavailable.”).
49. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4902(d) (West 2019).
50. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(2)(ii) (West 2019).
51. See Innocence Project, Bobby Ray Dixon, NAT’L REGISTRY EXOERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3179 [ https://
perma.cc/RA4A-7F72 ] (last updated Nov. 23, 2016 ).
52. See id.
53. Parisa Dehghani-Taftia & Paul Bieberaa, Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson
Investigation and Innocence Claims, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 549, 596 (2016).
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72(C)(2) (West 2019).
55. State v. Harris, No. 103924, 2016 WL 3570577 (Ohio App. June 30, 2016).
56. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1960).
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The Court: Did you do that?
Harris: I don’t admit it, but I’m guilty.
The Court: Did you have sexual conduct with [the victim]?
Harris: No, I did not.57
When Harris subsequently filed an application for post-conviction DNA
testing, the trial court denied the motion.58 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Ohio
quickly affirmed this ruling, citing Ohio’s post-conviction statute and concluding
that “because Harris’s application for DNA testing involved a rape offense to which
he pled guilty, he was not an eligible offender as defined by the statute.”59
Meanwhile, Kentucky’s post-conviction DNA testing statute generally
prohibits pleading defendants from seeking DNA testing. Under Kentucky’s
statute, the only pleading defendants who can seek such testing are (1) defendants
who entered Alford pleas; and (2) defendants who were given the death penalty.60
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky applied this prohibition to prevent Russell
Milburn from seeking DNA testing.61 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Milburn
pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia.62 Milburn later sought DNA testing, claiming that he was coerced
into entering a plea “because the Commonwealth offered to dismiss a bail jumping
charge that would have led to a property bond foreclosure on a family home.”63 The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky denied Milburn relief, finding that his valid guilty
plea to a non-capital offense precluded him from seeking DNA testing.64
b. Statutes Requiring that Identity was in Issue
Some states have statutes that require a defendant to establish that “identity
was in issue” to apply for post-conviction DNA testing.65 Courts in six of these
states construed these statutes as precluding pleading defendants from
seeking testing.
One of these states is Arkansas. Its statute allows for post-conviction DNA
testing only if “[t]he identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation
or prosecution of the offense.”66 In the Elwyn Graham case from the Introduction,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that Graham’s guilty plea foreclosed him
57. Harris, 2016 WL 3570577, at *3.
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *3.
60. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285(5)(d), (6)(d) (West 2019); see also Owens
v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. App. 2017) (“[T]he right to DNA testing is not available to
someone who pleaded guilty to the offense, unless the death penalty was imposed.”).
61. Milburn v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-CA-000417-MR, 2016 WL 1069124
(Ky. App. Mar. 18, 2016).
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id. at *4.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(7) (West 2019).
66. Id.
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from seeking DNA testing based on this statutory language. According to the court,
by pleading guilty to capital murder, Graham “admitted that he committed the
offense. His identity was thus not in question.”67
Similarly, Michigan’s post-conviction statute only allows DNA testing if “[t]he
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime was at issue during his or
her trial.”68 A federal district court found this requirement precluded a defendant
who pleaded guilty to sexual assault from seeking DNA testing of a foreign hair
collected from the victim’s body.69 The court concluded that the defendant’s “DNA
claim was ‘not on all fours with the statute as far as a post-conviction relief,’ because
there had not been a trial.”70
Montana’s post-conviction statute allows DNA testing if “the identity of the
perpetrator of the felony was or should have been a significant issue in the case.”71
In State v. DeAvila, Steve DeAvila unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea to
kidnapping and related charges due to mental health issues and later sought
post-conviction DNA testing.72 In finding that DeAvila was not entitled to DNA
testing, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that “[i]dentity is not an issue
when the defendant admits to committing the act, as DeAvila did in this case.”73
Pennsylvania courts have reached a similar conclusion. In Williams v. Erie
County Dist. Attorney’s Office, Charles Stephon Williams pleaded guilty to
endangering the welfare of a child and related crimes.74 Subsequently, Williams filed
a petition to inspect and test evidence in the State’s possession.75 The trial court
denied the petition, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that holding
on appeal.76 It cited to Pennsylvania’s post-conviction DNA testing statute, which
provides that a defendant seeking testing must present a prima facie case that the
“identity of or participation in the crime by the perpetrator was at issue in the
proceedings that resulted in the applicant’s conviction and sentencing.”77 The court
interpreted this section to mean that defendants who plead guilty cannot seek DNA
testing.78 Specifically, the court held that “[w]e fail to see how this mandatory
element of an applicant’s prima facie case can be demonstrated where he pleaded
guilty, thus nullifying any subsequent claim that the ‘identity of or the participation
in the crime by the perpetrator was at issue.’”79
67. Graham v. State, 188 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Ark. 2004).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.16(4)(b)(iii) (West 2019).
69. See Cassarrubias v. Prelesnik, No. 1:09-CV-1172, 2014 WL 1338172 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014).
70. Id. at *5.
71. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110(5)(c) (West 2019).
72. State v. DeAvila, No. DA 12-0380, 2013 WL 512695 (Mont. Feb. 12, 2013).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Williams v. Erie Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 848 A.2d 967, 968 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 972 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1(c)(3) (West 2002)).
78. Id.
79. Id. Pennsylvania recently changed its law so that defendants who pleaded guilty can seek
post-conviction DNA testing. See Pennsylvania DNA Testing Bills Signed Into Law!,
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In People v. Urioste, the Appellate Court of Illinois gave the most full-throated
defense of such an interpretation. In Urioste, Mark Urioste actually pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity to charges of murder, home invasion, armed violence,
and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault.80 After he was found guilty,
Urioste sought testing under Illinois’s post-conviction DNA statute, which required
him to make a prima facie case that “identity was the issue in the trial which resulted
in his or her conviction.”81
The court concluded that, by including this requirement,
our legislature wanted postconviction forensic testing to occur only in
those cases where such testing could discover new evidence at sharp odds
with a previously rendered guilty verdict based upon criminal acts that the
defendant denied having engaged in. Our legislature did not want convicted
defendants who admitted at their trial to the commission of the acts
charged, and did not contest the question of who committed those acts, to
make a mockery of the criminal justice system and the statute’s grace. It
did not want defendants who tendered unsuccessful affirmative defenses
at their trial to later disavow the commission of the acts charged, just so
they could obtain postconviction testing of evidence meaningless to how
they contested their guilt.82
Because Urioste admitted committing the acts charged through his insanity
plea, the court found that he was not entitled to DNA testing.83 In subsequent cases,
Illinois extended this logic to defendants who pleaded guilty, concluding that they
were not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing.84 In 2014, however, Illinois
amended its statute to allow pleading defendants to seek post-conviction DNA
testing largely based upon a case in which a man claimed that he pleaded guilty due
to being beaten by courtroom deputies.85
Delaware is the final state whose courts have read an “identity in issue” clause
to preclude pleading defendants from seeking post-conviction DNA testing.86
Pursuant to a plea agreement, William Wooten pleaded guilty but mentally ill to
second-degree kidnapping and murder.87 After being given a life sentence, Wooten
moved for post-conviction DNA testing.88 The superior court denied his motion
under Delaware’s post-conviction statute, which only allows for DNA testing if the

INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/pennsylvania-dna-law/
[ https://perma.cc/H2XU-FWFU ].
80. People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 709–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
81. Id. at 710.
82. Id. at 714.
83. Id. at 714–16.
84. See, e.g., People v. Lamming, 833 N.E.2d 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
85. Steve Mills, New Law to Help Inmates Prove Innocence with DNA Tests, CHI. TRIB. ( June
23, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-dna-guilty-pleas-met-20140623-story.html
[ https://perma.cc/WPW8-UZEP ].
86. Wooten v. State, No. 134, 1991, 1991 WL 134433 (Del. June 12, 1991).
87. Id.
88. Wooten v. State, No. 104, 2003, 2003 WL 22866416 (Del. Nov. 24, 2003).
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defendant “presents a prima facie case that identity was an issue in the trial.”89
While Wooten was appealing this decision to the Supreme Court of Delaware, he
died.90 That court then found that Wooten’s appeal was moot, concluding that
“[g]iven the frequency of guilty pleas in the Superior Court, the issue on appeal
clearly is capable of repetition and, therefore, opportunities will exist to review that
issue at some future time.”91 The appellate courts in Delaware, however, have not
subsequently addressed this issue.
Two states have “identity in issue” language in their statutes but explicitly
allow pleading defendants to seek post-conviction DNA testing. New Mexico’s
statute allows for a defendant to seek post-conviction DNA testing if (1) “identity
was an issue in the petitioner’s case;” or (2) “there is a reasonable probability that
the petitioner would not have pled guilty or been found guilty” if the requested
testing “had been performed prior to the petitioner’s conviction and the results had
been exculpatory.”92
Texas’s post-conviction DNA statute also requires a finding that “identity was
or is an issue in the case” before allowing a court to order testing.93 But the statute
goes on to state that,
[a] convicted person who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or, whether
before or after conviction, made a confession or similar admission in the
case may submit a motion under this chapter, and the convicting court is
prohibited from finding that identity was not an issue in the case solely on
the basis of that plea, confession, or admission, as applicable.94
Because of this clause, Christopher Ochoa was able to apply for DNA testing
despite pleading guilty to a 1988 rape and murder that occurred at an Austin Pizza
Hut.95 Ochoa claimed that he pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty, and, in 1998,
a man named Achim Josef Marino confessed to the rape and murder.96 Based upon
a finding that identity was an issue in Ochoa’s case, Ochoa was able to move for
DNA testing of semen recovered from the victim, which matched Marino and
excluded Ochoa. As a result, Ochoa was eventually exonerated in 2002.97
Finally, a number of other states have post-conviction DNA testing statutes
that contain “identity in issue” requirements but do not yet have court opinions
resolving whether these clauses preclude pleading defendants from seeking relief.
For example, (1) Maine’s statute requires that “[t]he identity of the person as the

89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a)(3) (2007).
90. Wooten, 2003 WL 22866416.
91. Id. at *1.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
93. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 (West 2019).
94. Id.
95. See Maurice Possley, Christopher Ochoa, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3511 [ https://perma.cc/7Z
L9-ATWS ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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perpetrator of the crime that resulted in the conviction was at issue during the
person’s trial;”98 and (2) New Jersey’s statute mandates that a DNA motion “explain
why the identity of the defendant was a significant issue in the case.”99 Meanwhile,
(1) Minnesota’s statute only applies if “identity was an issue in the trial;”100 and (2)
Georgia’s statute states that DNA testing is only authorized if “[t]he identity of the
perpetrator was, or should have been, a significant issue in the case.”101 Given that
these statutes do not contain explicit carve-outs for pleading defendants, it seems
reasonably probable that courts in these states will eventually read them to allow
only defendants convicted after trials to seek DNA testing.102
c. Statutes Referencing a Trial
Some state post-conviction DNA statutes don’t require identity to be in issue
but do have language making reference to a trial or being tried. Courts in two of
these states interpreted these types of statutes as precluding pleading defendants
from seeking post-conviction DNA testing.
One of those states was New York. In People v. Byrdsong, Clarence Byrdsong
was allegedly one of three men involved in a rape and robbery in Queens; he
eventually pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery.103 The other two men were never
apprehended, and a fingerprint recovered from the crime scene was not a match
for Byrdsong.104 After he was convicted, Byrdsong moved for DNA testing of crime
scene evidence. The trial court denied Byrdsong’s motion, finding that his guilty
plea precluded him from seeking relief under New York’s post-conviction DNA
statute.105 On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, noting that New York’s
post-conviction DNA statute provided that,
[w]here the defendant’s motion requests the performance of a forensic
DNA test on specified evidence, and upon the court’s determination that
any evidence containing [DNA] was secured in connection with the trial
resulting in the judgment, the court shall grant the application for forensic
DNA testing of such evidence upon its determination that if a DNA test
had been conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted
in the trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a reasonable probability
that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.106

98.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138 (2019).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2019).
99.
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01 (West 2019).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(C) (West 2019).
102. In State v. Morales, No. 05-04-1576, 2017 WL 3648541 (N.J. App. Aug. 25, 2017), the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division found that a defendant who had pleaded guilty had
failed to establish that his identity was a significant issue in the case. The court, however, did not explain
whether this conclusion was categorical or based upon the facts of the case.
103. People v. Byrdsong, 33 A.D.3d 175, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 177.
106. Id. at 176–77.
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Because this statute twice made reference to a “trial resulting in judgment,”
the Appellate Division construed it as only covering defendants convicted after
trials.107 Therefore, a pleading defendant like Byrdsong was not entitled to DNA
testing.108
Courts in Florida reached a similar conclusion. In Stewart v. State, Willie
Stewart pleaded nolo contendere to sexual battery and later claimed that DNA testing
of evidence in the State’s possession would exonerate him.109 At the time, however,
Florida’s post-conviction DNA testing statute provided that a defendant “who has
been tried and found guilty of committing a crime” may petition the court for DNA
testing.110 The District Court of Appeal therefore denied Stewart relief, concluding
that “[a] defendant who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may not seek
postconviction DNA testing based on language of the statute.”111 Notably, likely in
response to cases like the Byrdsong and Stewart cases, the legislatures in both New
York and Florida later amended their post-conviction statutes to allow pleading
defendants to seek DNA testing.112
Legislatures in other states did not need to amend similar statutes because
courts in those states found that they covered pleading defendants. One of those
states was Nebraska. In the 1980s, three men and three women (the “Beatrice Six”)
were charged in connection with the rape and murder of 68-year-old Helen Wilson
in Beatrice, Nebraska.113 Joseph White was convicted after a trial, and the other five
defendants, including Thomas Winslow, entered guilty or “no contest” pleas.114
Decades later, Winslow moved for DNA testing on semen from the crime
scene, and the district court denied his motion, concluding “that Winslow had
waived his right to DNA testing because of his plea of no contest.”115 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska noted that its post-conviction DNA testing statute
allows for a court to authorize DNA testing after making “a determination that such
testing was effectively not available at the time of trial.”116 The court noted the
similarity between this language and the language in the New York statute but
ultimately did “not read this reference to limit the scope of the relief granted under

107. Id. at 180.
108. Id.
109. Stewart v. State, 840 So.2d 438, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Brim v. State, 969 So.2d 552, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); New York DNA
Database: Governor Cuomo Signs ‘All Crimes’ DNA Testing Into Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20,
2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/20/new-york-dna-database-governor-cuomo-allcrimes-dna-testing_n_1366624.html [ https://perma.cc/DX7D-U7Q7 ].
113. See Innocence Project, Thomas Winslow, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3760 [ https://perma.cc/G6
B8-LCR4 ] (last updated July 6, 2016 ) [hereinafter Thomas Winslow].
114. Id.
115. State v. Winslow, 740 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 2007).
116. Id. at 799.
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the DNA Testing Act to persons convicted after a trial.”117 As a result, in late 2007,
Winslow got DNA testing on the semen.118 It came back as a match for Bruce Allen
Smith, “a leading suspect in the days after the murder” who was not a member of
the “Beatrice Six.”119 White’s conviction was subsequently vacated, and the
governor pardoned Winslow and the other members of the “Beatrice Six.”120
Courts in other states with similar statutes have not yet decided whether they
cover pleading defendants. In Alabama, the statute requires the defendant to
establish that the evidence to be tested “was not subjected to DNA testing because
the existence of the evidence was unknown to the petitioner or to the petitioner’s
trial attorney prior to trial or because the technology for the testing was not available
at the time of trial.”121 Arizona’s statute authorizes DNA testing only upon a
showing that “[t]he petitioner’s verdict or sentence would have been more favorable
if the results of deoxyribonucleic acid testing had been available at the trial leading
to the judgment of conviction.”122 Louisiana law demands “[a] factual explanation
of why there is an articulable doubt, based on competent evidence whether or not
introduced at trial, as to the guilt of the petitioner in that DNA testing will resolve
the doubt and establish the innocence of the petitioner.”123 Nevada’s statute
requires “[a] statement that the type of genetic marker analysis the petitioner is
requesting was not available at the time of trial.”124 North Dakota’s statute only
allows DNA testing if “[t]he testing is to be performed on evidence secured in
relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction.”125 In Utah the statute requires
“a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have been convicted or
would have received a lesser sentence if the evidence had been presented at the
original trial.”126 Based on the disparate results reached by courts in New York,
Florida, and Nebraska in interpreting similar statutes, it is unclear whether courts in
these other states will read their statutes to preclude pleading defendants from
seeking testing.
Two other states have statutes that do not mention a trial but do mention a
“verdict,” which is generally defined as a “formal decision or finding made by a
jury, impaneled and sworn for the trial of a cause, and reported to the court (and
accepted by it) upon the matters duly submitted to them upon trial.”127 Specifically,
the statutes in Connecticut and Rhode Island both require a defendant to establish
“[a] reasonable probability exists that the requested testing will produce DNA

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See Thomas Winslow, supra note 113.
Id.
Id.
ALA. CODE § 15-18-200(e)(2)(B) (2019).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240(C)(1)(a) (2019).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1(B)(1) (2019).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.0918(3)(e) (2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-32.1-15(1)(a) (West 2019).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301(2)(f)(ii) (West 2019).
Verdict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
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results which would have altered the verdict or reduced the petitioner’s sentence if
the results had been available at the prior proceedings leading to the judgment
of conviction.”128
d. Statutes with No Reference to Trial or Identity
Some post-conviction DNA statutes do not contain language referencing a
trial or the requirement that identity was in issue. Courts in different states have
interpreted these statutes disparately. In 2016, Maryland’s highest court found in
Jamison v. State that the state’s post-conviction DNA testing statute did not apply to
pleading defendants.129 In 1990, William Jamison had been charged with various sex
offenses in Maryland and entered an Alford plea.130 Eighteen years later, Jamison
filed a petition for DNA testing of newly discovered slides containing cellular
material taken from the victim.131 The circuit court granted the motion, and DNA
testing produced debatable results.132 Jamison’s experts claimed that the testing
pointed to someone else as the perpetrator while the State’s experts alleged that the
results were too ambiguous to be meaningful.133
The circuit court concluded that Jamison had failed to prove his innocence,
prompting his appeal.134 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, resolved that
appeal on an entirely different basis: that Jamison was not even entitled to seek
DNA testing.135 At the time, Maryland’s post-conviction DNA testing statute stated
that “a court shall order DNA testing if the court finds that . . . a reasonable
probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or
sentencing.”136 Despite the absence of a reference to a trial or identity being in
issue,137 the court held that “[o]nly subsequent to a conviction after trial can the
‘substantial possibility’ standard be applied.”138 Therefore, the court concluded
“that a person who has pled guilty cannot avail himself of post-conviction
DNA testing.”139
The court ended its opinion by noting the issue facing pleading defendants
under its law, but it found that “legislative action may be more appropriate” to
resolve that issue.140 On April 18, 2018, the Maryland legislature did just that,
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(c)(1) (West 2019); 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 10-9.1-12(a)(1) (West 2019).
129. Jamison v. State, 148 A.3d 1267, 1284 (Md. 2016).
130. Id. at 1268.
131. Id. at 1268–69.
132. Jamison v. State, No. 03-K-90-003657, 2015 WL 11108662 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2015).
133. Id. at *13–16.
134. Jamison, 148 A.3d at 1270.
135. Id. at 1284.
136. Id. at 1278 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2003)).
137. The statute contained an “identity in issue” clause that was removed in 2003. Id. at 1279.
138. Id. at 1283.
139. Id. at 1284.
140. Id.
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passing a bill allowing pleading defendants to (1) seek post-conviction DNA testing;
and (2) bring freestanding claims of actual innocence based on
non-DNA evidence.141
Legislatures in other states with similar statutes have not needed to amend
their laws because courts in those states have interpreted them as covering pleading
defendants. Kansas’s post-conviction DNA testing statute allows for a defendant
to seek DNA testing if he can establish that the evidence to be tested (1) is related
to the investigation or prosecution; (2) is in the actual or constructive possession of
the State; and (3) was not previously tested or was previously tested but now can be
retested through “new DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of
more accurate and probative results.”142
In finding that pleading defendants are entitled to seek testing under this law
in State v. Smith, the Court of Appeals of Kansas held that “[t]he legislature is
perfectly capable of limiting such post-conviction relief to those who pled not guilty
or no contest to the material charges, and no such limitation appears in the text of
the statute.”143 The court then noted that Kansas laws allow for pleas to be set aside
under some circumstances; therefore, “[b]ecause such a plea is not necessarily
irrevocable, it would be inconsistent with the broad legislative goal if DNA testing
was unavailable solely because a guilty plea was entered.”144
Washington’s post-conviction DNA testing statute also doesn’t reference
guilty pleas, trials, or identity being in issue during the investigation or prosecution
of the case. It merely requires the defendant to “[e]xplain why DNA evidence is
material to the identity of the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to
sentence enhancement.”145 In other words, a defendant need not establish that
identity was in issue at the time when he was convicted, just that the evidence he
wants tested would be material to the identity of the perpetrator or accomplice.
Courts in Washington have interpreted this statute as permitting pleading
defendants to seek post-conviction DNA testing. In 2005, 16-year-old Michael
Washington was a suspect in a home invasion that resulted in a physical
altercation.146 The police recovered duct tape from a windowsill that appeared to be
connected to the crime.147 When the prosecution “threatened to charge
[Washington] as an adult with multiple counts of first-degree burglary, [he] pleaded

141. Alex Mann, Legislature Passes Bill to Expand Post-Conviction Relief, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/maryland/articles/2018-04-18/
legislature-passes-bill-to-expand-post-conviction-relief [ https://perma.cc/EWB2-UTL6 ].
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(a) (West 2019).
143. State v. Smith, 119 P.3d 679, 683 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
144. Id.
145. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2019).
146. See Maurice Possley, Michael Washington, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5185 [ https://perma.cc/VB
K9-AYTY ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ).
147. Id.
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no contest in juvenile court to the charge of burglary with sexual motivation.”148
Washington later successfully moved for DNA testing on the duct tape; “[b]oth
male and female DNA were found on the tape, and the analysis revealed that
Washington’s DNA was not present.”149 Upon a motion by the Snohomish County
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the court subsequently dismissed
Washington’s conviction.150
Other states have open-ended post-conviction DNA statutes that have not yet
been applied by courts in cases of pleading defendants: (1) Colorado’s statute
requires the defendant to establish that “[c]onclusive DNA results were not
available prior to the petitioner’s conviction;”151 and (2) Indiana’s statute requires a
reasonable probability that exculpatory DNA results would have led to the
defendant either (a) not being prosecuted or convicted; or (b) receiving a lesser
sentence.152 Given the open ended nature of such statutes, it is unclear whether
courts in those states will construe them to cover pleading defendants.
C. Non-DNA Actual Innocence Statutes
1. History
Historically, defendants could not bring freestanding claims of actual
innocence.153 Instead, a defendant typically had two options after being convicted.
First, he could seek relief by presenting newly discovered evidence of innocence
“within a year or two, or even as little as twenty-one days, after conviction.”154
Second, a defendant could combine evidence of actual innocence with evidence of
a constitutional violation. For example, a defendant could not bring a freestanding
claim of actual innocence based upon a new alibi witness; instead, he would have to
package it with another claim, such as a claim that his attorney was ineffective in
failing to contact that alibi witness before trial.155 And, a defendant could not bring
a freestanding claim of actual innocence based upon an alternate suspect’s
confession; instead, he would have to package it with another claim, such as a claim
that the confession was Brady material that the State failed to disclose before trial.156

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413(1)(a) (West 2019).
152. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-7-8(4) (West 2019).
153. See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Constitutional
Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the Aftermath
of CPL (Section) 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1472–73 (2013).
154. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 346 (2002).
155. See, e.g., Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of Actual Innocence
in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 221–22 (2003).
156. See id.
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Based upon the successes of post-conviction DNA statutes, some states
modified existing mechanisms or created new mechanisms so that defendants could
bring freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence months
or years after their convictions.157 Some of these mechanisms include petitions for
writs of habeas corpus, petitions for post-conviction relief, and petitions for writs
of actual innocence.158 States mainly apply similar standards of proof for
determining whether to grant new trials based on non-DNA evidence of actual
innocence. Under Maryland’s statute, a court determines whether the defendant’s
proffered evidence of actual innocence “creates a substantial or significant
possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been
judicially determined.”159 Meanwhile, D.C.’s statute asks the court to assess “[h]ow
the new evidence demonstrates actual innocence.”160
2. Statutory Requirements and Pleading Defendants
Some states have statutes that discriminate between pleading and non-pleading
defendants seeking to present freestanding claims of actual innocence based on
non-DNA evidence. Virginia’s actual innocence statute states in relevant part that
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, upon a
petition of a person who was convicted of a felony upon a plea of not
guilty, or the petition of a person who was adjudicated delinquent, upon a
plea of not guilty, by a circuit court of an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, the Court of Appeals shall have the authority to
issue writs of actual innocence under this chapter.161
Under this statute, Brandon James Clark was not able to present testimony by
“eyewitnesses, including one of the two victims, . . . that Clark was not a perpetrator
of [a] shooting” because he had entered an Alford plea in connection with the
shooting.162
Maryland courts also found that pleading defendants cannot bring
freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence. In Yonga
v. State, Sam Yonga pleaded guilty to a third-degree sexual offense before bringing
a petition for writ of actual innocence based upon recantations by the victim and
her mother.163 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland later noted that such writs
based upon newly discovered evidence of innocence are decided by looking “at the
original trial in front of the original jury and then hypothesiz[ing] submitting the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 222–23.
See id. at 220–23.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301(a)(1) (West 2018).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4135(g)(1) (West 2019).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.10 (West 2019).
Clark v. Clarke, 648 F. App’x 333, 334 (4th Cir. 2016).
Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 451–53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
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newly discovered evidence to that original jury.”164 According to the court, such an
assessment is impossible in cases with pleading defendants:
There is . . . no way to compare the trial that was with the trial that might
have been when there was no trial that was. Where there was no trial, it
would be utter speculation to attempt to construct what the imaginary trial
might have consisted of. We may not hypothesize a mythical trial. The
statement of facts offered in support of the guilty plea is only minimalist.
A State’s Attorney’s Office going before a jury would almost certainly opt
for a more maximal case of guilt. We do not know, therefore, what
witnesses would have been called or what, under direct and
cross-examination, they might have said. We do not know whether the
appellant would or would not have testified and, if he did testify, how his
testimony would have held up. We do not know what medical reports
might have been submitted. There would be self-evidently no way to make
the prescribed comparison. Newly discovered evidence simply cannot be
measured in the case of a conviction based on a guilty plea. With what cast
of characters, moreover, would we people our hypothetical testing? Do we
ask whether the hypothetical jury that might have rendered a guilty verdict
after a hypothetical trial would probably have rendered a different verdict?
Or do we ask, as in this case, whether Judge Levitz would still have
accepted the guilty plea? These are very different questions. The criteria
for rendering a trial verdict and the criteria for accepting a guilty plea are
not remotely the same.165
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed this reasoning on appeal166 and
later applied it in other cases.167 But, as noted previously, on April 18, 2018, the
Maryland legislature changed the law, passing a bill allowing pleading defendants to
(1) seek post-conviction DNA testing; and (2) bring freestanding claims of actual
innocence based on non-DNA evidence.168
New York law, however, still discriminates between pleading and
non-pleading defendants in the non-DNA context. In People v. Hamilton, Derrick
Hamilton was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial based largely on
the testimony of the victim’s girlfriend, Jewel Smith.169 Subsequently, Hamilton
moved to vacate his conviction based
upon Smith’s recantation of her trial testimony, the discovery of
exculpatory evidence that Smith told police shortly after the crime that she
did not witness the crime, and the discovery of a new defense witness who
claimed that she was with Smith inside a supermarket at the time of
the crime.170
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Yonga v. State, 130 A.3d 486 (Md. 2016).
See, e.g., Jamison v. State, 148 A.3d 1267, 1281–82 (Md. 2016).
See Mann, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
Id.
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In addressing Hamilton’s motion, an appellate court noted that New York’s
post-conviction statute did not specifically authorize a freestanding claim of actual
innocence.171 Nonetheless, the court found that Hamilton was entitled to make such
a claim under two provisions of New York’s Constitution. First, because “a person
who has not committed any crime has a liberty interest in remaining free from
punishment, the conviction or incarceration of a guiltless person, which deprives
that person of freedom of movement and freedom from punishment and violates
elementary fairness, runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”172 Second, “because
punishing an actually innocent person is inherently disproportionate to the acts
committed by that person, such punishment also violates the provision of the New
York Constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.”173
In the Tiger case from the Introduction, however, the Court of Appeals of
New York refused to extend this logic to pleading defendants. According to the
court, “[t]he plea process is integral to the criminal justice system and we have
observed that there are significant public policy reasons for upholding plea
agreements, including conserving judicial resources and providing finality in
criminal proceedings.”174 Indeed, the court even noted that “we have recognized
that a defendant can plead guilty to a nonexistent or legally impossible offense in
satisfaction of an indictment that charges a higher offense.”175 Therefore,
[a]llowing a collateral attack on a guilty plea obtained in a judicial
proceeding that comported with all of the requisite constitutional
protections on the basis of a delayed claim of actual innocence would be
inconsistent with our jurisprudence and would effectively defeat the
finality that attends a constitutionally obtained guilty plea.176
As a result, the court was able to conclude that “a guilty plea entered in
proceedings where the record demonstrates the conviction was constitutionally
obtained will presumptively foreclose an independent actual innocence claim.”177
In a concurring opinion, Justice Garcia added an additional concern with
allowing a pleading defendant to later bring a claim of actual innocence.
Allowing a defendant to strategically relitigate culpability—at a time when
the prosecution’s evidence has grown stale, or may be entirely
undeveloped—would undermine critical notions of fairness, finality, and
sanctity of the legal process, and would “turn the ‘solemn act’ of pleading
guilty into a mere device for maintaining innocence while avoiding trial”178
Conversely, other states and jurisdictions explicitly allow pleading defendants

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 105–07.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 108.
People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 515–16 (N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Garcia, J., concurring).
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to bring freestanding claims of actual innocence based upon non-DNA evidence.
Arizona’s actual innocence law provides that “[a]ny person who pled guilty or no
contest, admitted a probation violation, or whose probation was automatically
violated based upon a plea of guilty or no contest shall have the right to file a
post-conviction relief proceeding.”179 D.C.’s law states that “[i]f the conviction
resulted from a guilty plea, [the court may consider] the specific reason the movant
pleaded guilty despite being actually innocent of the crime.”180 And Utah’s law
indicates that “[i]f the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence
was based upon a plea of guilty, the petition shall contain the specific nature and
content of the evidence that establishes factual innocence.”181
Kevin Peterson was able to use this Utah law to prove his actual innocence
despite his guilty plea.182 Peterson had been accused of sexually abusing his son and
eventually entered into a plea agreement, which stated in pertinent part, “I did not
sexually abuse [my son]. However, after being fully advised as to the consequences
of my decision by my attorney, I want to plead guilty to the second-degree
felony.”183 After Peterson was convicted, his son recanted.184 Peterson’s attorneys
also retained two experts who reviewed the medical examination of Peterson’s son
and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual abuse.185 Based on this new
evidence, Peterson filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence; the State did not
oppose it.186 Peterson was released fifteen years after being arrested.187
Other states have mechanisms by which defendants can bring freestanding
claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence and have not yet resolved
whether they cover pleading defendants.188
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO POST-CONVICTION DNA AND
NON-DNA ACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTES
A. Introduction
Because these post-conviction DNA and non-DNA statutes contain
requirements that can be difficult to satisfy, pleading and non-pleading defendants
have frequently brought constitutional challenges after being unable to seek or
present evidence of actual innocence. This Section reviews the constitutional

179. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 33.1.
180. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4135(g)(1)(E) (West 2019).
181. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(4) (West 2019).
182. Janelle Stecklein, Utah Man Vindicated After Serving 15 Years for Child Sexual Abuse,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 15, 2013), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=55960859&itype=
CMSID [ https://perma.cc/J6E6-NBVC ].
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(2) (West 2019).
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challenges raised by defendants and explains why they have left many pleading
defendants without a way to prove their actual innocence.
B. Substantive and Procedural Due Process Challenges
1. Introduction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”189
This clause affords two types of protection: substantive due process and procedural
due process.190 Substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging
in ‘conduct that shocks the conscience[ ]’. . . or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’”191 Meanwhile, procedural due process provides that
“[w]hen government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives
substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.”192
2. Post-conviction DNA Statutes
Prior to 2009, some courts found that there was a substantive due process
right to post-conviction DNA testing. In Wade v. Brady, Robert Wade was charged
with felony murder in Massachusetts based upon the felony of rape.193 At trial,
Wade unsuccessfully raised the defense that the predicate sexual act was
consensual.194 Blood and semen evidence from the crime scene “suggested that
another individual may have been involved in the rape (either in addition to, or in
lieu of, Wade).”195 Wade thus sought post-conviction DNA testing, but the superior
court denied his petition, finding that Wade’s new claim that he did not have sex
with the victim was “unconvincing and in direct conflict with Wade’s trial theory of
consent.”196
After unsuccessfully appealing in state court, Wade brought a § 1983197 action
in federal court, claiming that he had a constitutional right to DNA testing.198 The
district court agreed, concluding, “[b]ecause the individual interests implicated by
DNA testing so profoundly outweigh the adverse impact on the state, I find that
the Due Process Clause provides a substantive right to post-conviction DNA

189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 652 (6th Cir. 2011).
191. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
192. Id.
193. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229 (D. Mass. 2006).
194. Id. at 232.
195. Id. at 229.
196. Id. at 232.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on any person “who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custome, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes . . . the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.”
198. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
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testing in cases where testing could raise serious doubts about the
original verdict.”199
The United States Supreme Court, however, pumped the brakes on this line
of cases in its 2009 opinion in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne (Osborne IV).200 In Osborne, William Osborne and Dexter Jackson
were convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault after a jury trial.201 Prior
to trial, the State had done DQ Alpha testing on a blue condom that the victim said
was used by one of the assailants.202 The testing determined that semen found on
the condom had a genotype that matched a blood sample taken from Osborne, who
is African-American; approximately 16% of African-Americans have such
a genotype.203
After he was convicted, Osborne brought a post-conviction review petition,
which, inter alia, sought more discriminating restriction-fragment-length-polymorphism
(RFLP) testing on the semen found on the condom.204 After the superior court
denied the petition, Osborne appealed to the Court of Appeals of Alaska. That court
held that Osborne did not meet two requirements of Alaska’s post-conviction DNA
testing statute because (1) the evidence—the semen on the condom—was not newly
discovered, and (2) Osborne did not exercise due diligence in presenting his claim.205
The court also concluded that “Osborne has no due process right under the federal
constitution to present new evidence to establish his factual innocence.”206
That said, the court then noted that “several state courts have held that
defendants have a due process right, under their respective state constitutions, to
obtain post-conviction DNA testing of physical evidence, and to offer the results
of that testing to establish their factual innocence.”207 These state courts held that
this right is triggered when the defendant can establish that (1) his conviction rested
primarily on eyewitness identification; (2) there was a demonstrable doubt
concerning the identification; and (3) scientific testing would likely be conclusive
on this issue.208 The court of appeals found a similar due process right existed under
the Alaska Constitution and remanded the case to the superior court to determine
whether Osborne could satisfy this three-part test.209 On remand, the superior court

199. Id. at 249.
200. Dist. Attorney’s Off. for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne (Osborne IV), 557
U.S. 52 (2009).
201. Id. at 58.
202. Id. at 57.
203. Id. at 57–58.
204. Id. at 58.
205. See Osborne v. State (Osborne State I), 110 P.3d 986, 992 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005), superseded
by statute, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.73.020 (West 2019), as recognized in Lambert v. State, 435 P.3d 1011
(Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
206. Id. at 995.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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found that Osborne had failed to satisfy all three parts of this test, a decision that
was upheld on appeal.210
Osborne then brought a § 1983 action in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska, claiming that he had a federal constitutional right to
post-conviction DNA testing.211 That court held that Osborne had “a limited due
process right of access to the evidence for purposes of post-conviction DNA
testing” because (1) the testing sought was not available to Osborne at the time of
trial; (2) the testing could be easily performed without cost or prejudice to the
Government; and (3) the test results could either confirm Osborne’s guilt or
provide evidence upon which Osborne might seek a new trial.212
The State thereafter appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which started its analysis
with Brady v. Maryland.213 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the State has an
obligation under the Due Process Clause to turn over material exculpatory evidence
to the defense.214 And, while Brady is a pre-trial right, the Ninth Circuit noted that
it had applied Brady in a post-trial context in Thomas v. Goldsmith.215 In Thomas, the
Ninth Circuit had held that the Due Process Clause required the State “‘to come
forward with any exculpatory semen evidence in its possession’” that could support
his claim of actual innocence in his federal habeas petition.216 Finding nothing to
distinguish Thomas from the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit found that Osborne
was “entitled to assert in this § 1983 action the due process right to post-conviction
access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence that we recognized in Thomas.”217
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to decide (1)
whether Osborne’s claims could be pursued under § 1983 ; and (2) whether he had
a due process right to the State’s evidence for DNA testing.218 In a 2009 opinion,
the Court found that Osborne lacked such a right, obviating the need to resolve the
§ 1983 issue.219 First, the Court quickly dispensed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding,
finding that Brady only applies in the pre-trial context.220 Second, the Court
concluded that there is no substantive due process right of access to DNA
evidence.221 Instead, the Court held that the case was governed by Medina
v. California, which provides a procedural due process framework for assessing the

210. Osborne IV, 557 U.S. 52, 59 (2009).
211. Id. at 60.
212. See Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Off. for Third Judicial Dist. (Osborne III), 521 F.3d 1118,
1122 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (“[W]e affirm the judgment of the district court
that . . . Osborne has a limited due process right of access to the evidence for purposes of
post-conviction DNA testing.”).
213. Id. at 1128.
214. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
215. Osborne III, 521 F.3d at 1128.
216. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1992)).
217. Id. at 1132.
218. Osborne IV, 557 U.S. 52, 61 (2009).
219. Id. at 102–03.
220. See id. at 68.
221. Id.
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validity of state procedural rules that are part of the criminal process.222 Under the
Medina framework, a state procedural rule only violates procedural due process if it
“offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental” or “transgresses any recognized principle
of fundamental fairness in operation.”223
The Court then found that Alaska’s post-conviction DNA testing statute
passed constitutional muster under this procedural due process framework because
the statute (1) provided a right to DNA evidence upon a showing that the evidence
could establish innocence; (2) exempted petitions for post-conviction DNA testing
from otherwise applicable statutes of limitation; and (3) specified a discovery
procedure available to those seeking access to DNA evidence.224 And, while
Alaska’s statute did place limits on this right, the Court found that these limits were
similar to those contained in federal law and the laws of other states.225 The Supreme
Court also noted that the Court of Appeals of Alaska recognized a separate right of
access to DNA testing under its state constitution that could provide a failsafe for
defendants who can’t comply with the strictures of its DNA statute.226
Two years later, in 2011, the Supreme Court revisited the right to
post-conviction DNA testing in Skinner v. Switzer.227 In Skinner, a Texas jury found
Henry Skinner guilty of murdering his live-in girlfriend and her two sons.228 Skinner
thereafter twice sought DNA testing of previously untested items from the crime
scene, including knives, an axe handle, vaginal swabs, fingernail clippings, and hair
samples.229 The Texas courts rejected Skinner’s first motion, concluding that he
failed to demonstrate a “reasonable probability . . . that he would not have
been . . . convicted if the DNA test results were exculpatory.”230 Later, the Texas
courts rejected Skinner’s second motion, finding that defense counsel had made a
strategic decision not to test the evidence at trial.231
Skinner then brought a § 1983 action, claiming that these applications of
Texas’s DNA statute violated procedural due process.232 Both the federal district
and appellate courts found, however, that § 1983 was an improper vehicle for
Skinner’s DNA claim.233 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer this
question that had gone unanswered in Osborne.234 Ultimately, the Court concluded
that § 1983 was the proper vehicle for such a claim and remanded the case without
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 69 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992)).
Id. at 69–71.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 527.
Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Skinner, 562 U.S. at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id.
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reaching the merits.235 In remanding, however, the Court noted that “Osborne
severely limits the federal action a state prisoner may bring for DNA testing . . . and
left slim room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him
procedural due process.”236
Since Osborne, no court has found that a state’s post-conviction DNA testing
statute violates procedural due process. The most notable of these opinions is
McKithen v. Brown (McKithen II).237 In McKithen, Frank McKithen was convicted of
attempted murder and related crimes after stabbing his wife with a knife.238 After
he was convicted, McKithen filed a motion seeking court-ordered testing to
determine whether his fingerprints and/or his wife’s blood were on the knife that
was allegedly used in the crime.239 The post-conviction court denied his motion,
finding that McKithen failed to prove under New York’s DNA statute that there
was a reasonable probability that the results of DNA testing would have resulted in
a more favorable verdict.240
After unsuccessfully appealing in New York state court, McKithen brought a
§ 1983 action in federal court.241 In an opinion issued about a year before the
Supreme Court decided Osborne, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found that McKithen had a procedural due process right to
DNA testing.242 The court reached this conclusion by applying the three part
procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, which focuses on (1)
the petitioner’s private interest; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest
through the current procedure(s) and the probable value of additional safeguards;
and (3) the State’s countervailing interest.243
By the time the Second Circuit issued its opinion on appeal, the Supreme
Court had handed down its Osborne opinion. As noted, that opinion found that the
correct procedural due process framework was the state-friendly “fundamental
fairness” framework created by Medina v. California, not the defendant-friendly
framework from Mathews v. Eldridge.244 Therefore, the Second Circuit was quickly
able to dispense with the district court’s reasoning and proceed with an analysis
done by many other federal courts in the wake of Osborne:245 compare the DNA
statute at hand with Alaska’s statute.246
235. Id. at 534.
236. Id. at 525.
237. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen II), 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
238. Id. at 145–46.
239. Id. at 146.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen I), 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 626
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
243. Id. at 452 (construing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1979)).
244. McKithen II, 626 F.3d at 152.
245. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Attorney Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1266–67 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012);
Tevlin v. Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 71 (1st Cir. 2010).
246. McKithen II, 626 F.3d at 153–54.
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Under this analysis, it was clear that the standards in Alaska’s post-conviction
DNA statute were more restrictive and difficult to meet than the standards in New
York’s statute.247 The principal difference is that New York allows post-conviction
DNA testing upon a showing that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been more favorable if such testing had been done at the time of trial.248
Conversely, Alaska requires a petitioner to establish that DNA testing can “clearly
and convincingly” or “conclusively” prove his innocence.249 This comparison
allowed the Second Circuit to conclude that, “[a] fortiori, New York’s procedure for
post-conviction DNA testing must be constitutional as well.”250
Courts have applied a similar analysis in cases in which defendants claimed
that post-conviction DNA testing statutes with pleading defendant prohibitions
violated procedural due process. In the aforementioned case in federal court in
Michigan, the defendant claimed that Michigan’s DNA statute violated procedural
due process by precluding pleading defendants from seeking relief.251 In response,
the court quickly concluded that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has held that Michigan law
governing procedures for post-conviction DNA testing in criminal cases is more
comprehensive than the state procedures sanctioned in Osborne, and, thus,
adequately protects the due process rights of prisoners.”252
3. Non-DNA/Actual Innocence Statutes
Pleading and non-pleading defendants have also made due process challenges
to statutes that prevent them from presenting freestanding claims of actual
innocence based on non-DNA evidence. Some of these challenges have dealt with
pleading defendant prohibitions, and some of them have been successful under state
Due Process clauses. In March 2018, the Supreme Court of Iowa issued its opinion
in Schmidt v. State, in which Jacob Lee Schmidt had pleaded guilty to assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse in exchange for the State dismissing two counts of
sexual abuse in the third degree.253 Schmidt later sought to prove his actual
innocence based upon a recantation by the victim.254 Iowa’s post-conviction statute,
however, did not allow pleading defendants to present freestanding actual
innocence claims.255
The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that this prohibition violated the Due
Process Clause of the Iowa Constitution, finding that “[a]n innocent person has a

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
2014).
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Cassarrubias v. Prelesnik, No. 1:09-CV-1172, 2014 WL 1338172 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31,
Id. at *6.
Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 782–83 (Iowa 2018).
Id. at 781.
Id. at 784.
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constitutional liberty interest in remaining free from undeserved punishment.”256
Therefore, “[h]olding a person who has committed no crime in prison strikes the
very essence of the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process.”257 As
support for its conclusion, the court cited similar opinions by the Illinois and New
Mexico Supreme Courts.258
Other courts, however, have found that there is no state due process right to
present freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence. In In
re Lincoln v. Cassady, Missourian Rodney Lincoln was convicted of assaulting
“M.D.,” a seven year-old.259 M.D. later recanted her eyewitness identification of
Lincoln, claiming “that she was traumatized and pressured into identifying [Lincoln]
as the assailant, and now believes that the assailant was a serial killer whose family
owned a Volkswagen repair shop in the area of the crimes.”260 Lincoln moved to
use this recantation to prove his actual innocence, but the motion was denied under
Missouri’s post-conviction statute.261
Subsequently, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Lincoln’s due process
challenge, finding that the Supreme Court of Missouri had “expressly declined to
determine whether the continued incarceration and eventual execution of a person
who clearly and convincingly establishes actual innocence violates the due process
clause of the constitution, resulting in a manifest injustice warranting habeas
relief.”262 On his last day in office on June 1, 2018, Missouri Governor Eric Greitens
commuted Lincoln’s sentence to time served based on evidence of his innocence,
leading to Lincoln’s release after thirty-four years of incarceration.263
Similarly, in Yonga v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
a pleading defendant had no substantive due process right to prove his actual
innocence through evidence of the victim’s recantation.264 And, in the Tiger case
from the Introduction, the Court of Appeals of New York failed to extend
precedent finding a state due process right to present non-DNA evidence of actual
innocence to pleading defendants.265
In the wake of Osborne, no defendant has been successful in claiming that a
state’s non-DNA actual innocence statute violates the federal Due Process Clause.
In Dawson v. Suthers, James Dawson claimed that the State of Colorado’s statutory
256. Id. at 793.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 792–93 (first citing People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996); and then
citing Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007)).
259. Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
260. Id. at 16.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 22.
263. 41 Action News Staff, Governor Greitens Commutes Rodney Lincoln’s Sentence on Last Day
in Office, 41 KSHB KAN. CITY ( June 2, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/
governor-greitens-pardons-rodney-lincoln [ https://perma.cc/CD4X-FPPB ].
264. Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 455 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015), aff’d, 130 A.3d 486
(Md. 2016).
265. See People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 517 (N.Y. 2018).
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requirements to get testing of blood or urine to establish a post-conviction claim of
actual innocence based on an intoxication defense violated procedural due
process.266 The United States District Court for the District of Colorado noted that
Colorado’s post-conviction DNA statute satisfied Osborne and concluded that “it
can hardly be that the due process clause would require states to grant
postconviction access to scientific testing for determining drug concentrations in
blood or urine where that same postconviction testing scheme would not allow
access to DNA testing in the same circumstances.”267
C. Equal Protection Clause Challenges
1. Introduction
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”268 To establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) intentional or purposeful State discrimination led to him being treated
different from similarly situated individuals, and (2) the disparate treatment was not
justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.269 If a state statute does not interfere
with a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class, the level of scrutiny
is the rational basis test, which considers whether “the challenged classification is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”270 Post-conviction DNA
and non-DNA actual innocence statutes neither interfere with a fundamental right
nor discriminate against a suspect class, meaning that they are subject to the rational
basis test.271
2. Post-conviction DNA Statutes
Defendants in several states have brought Equal Protection Clause challenges
to post-conviction DNA testing statutes. These challenges have led to disparate
results in different jurisdictions. One of these challenges was successful in State
v. Denney.272 Dale Denney had been convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy after
a jury trial in Kansas.273 Denney later filed a petition for DNA testing of the rape
kit and other pieces of evidence from the crime scene.274 The district court denied
Denney’s motion because Kansas’s post-conviction DNA statute only allows for

266. Dawson v. Suthers, No. 14-cv-01919-MSK-NYW, 2015 WL 5525786, at *1–2
(D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2015).
267. Id. at *5.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
269. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
270. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988).
271. See, e.g., State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1262 (Kan. 2004).
272. Id. at 1258.
273. Id. at 1259.
274. Id. at 1260.
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testing in first-degree murder and rape cases.275 Denney subsequently appealed,
claiming that the statute violated “the Equal Protection Clause because there is no
rational basis for authorizing DNA testing for those convicted of rape, and for not
authorizing DNA testing for those convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy.”276
The Supreme Court of Kansas began by noting that the purpose of Kansas’s
post-conviction DNA statute is to help determine whether someone in state
custody was wrongfully convicted or sentenced.277 The court then made the
threshold determination that those convicted of rape and those convicted of
aggravated criminal sodomy are similarly situated.278 Having made this finding, the
court rejected the State’s proffered reason of cost for distinguishing between those
convicted of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy, concluding that “cutting
costs . . . is not a rational basis for discrimination.”279 Finally, the court raised a
difference in the severity of the crimes as a possible basis for distinction but
ultimately concluded that rape and aggravated criminal sodomy are crimes with
similar levels of severity.280 Therefore, the court concluded that Kansas’s
post-conviction DNA statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and remanded
for a determination of whether Denney qualified for testing.281
In State v. Cheeks, the Supreme Court of Kansas applied similar reasoning to
conclude that Kansas’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by allowing
defendants convicted of first-degree murder to seek DNA testing while precluding
defendants convicted of second-degree murder from seeking the same.282 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Biles advanced a different rationale for the
distinction: “the well-recognized government interest in promoting finality of
judgments.”283 The majority, however, turned this argument aside, finding “no
legitimate reason for placing someone convicted of first-degree murder/rape in a
different position as to the finality of judgment than someone convicted of
second-degree murder.”284
Conversely, a similar challenge was rejected in Maryland. In Washington v.
State, Trendon Washington tried to use Cheeks to secure a similar ruling by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland.285 Washington had been convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder in connection with the death of Ricardo Paige.286 A broom and dust
pan found at the crime scene that could have been used to sweep up spent shell
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Id.
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1268–69.
State v. Cheeks, 310 P.3d 346, 354 (Kan. 2013).
Id. at 359 (Biles, J., dissenting).
Id. at 354.
Washington v. State, 148 A.3d 341 (Md. 2016).
Id. at 344–45.
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casings tested positive for blood but were not tested for DNA.287 After Washington
was convicted, he filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing.288 The circuit
court denied that motion, finding that Maryland’s post-conviction DNA statute
covers “crimes of violence” but that conspiracy to commit a violent crime is not a
crime of violence.289
The Court of Appeals of Maryland later affirmed, finding that a defendant
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder is not similarly situated to a person
convicted of murder because a “conviction of conspiracy to commit murder does
not generally require physical presence at the scene of the underlying crime.”290
Instead, “[t]o commit conspiracy, the law only requires an individual to have entered
into an agreement with another to commit a crime, and to have actually intended
for the crime to be committed.”291 Finally, the court found, inter alia, that “it is
rational for the State to conclude that DNA evidence related to a crime that requires
some physical presence is more likely to exonerate an individual than DNA evidence
related to a crime that can be completed through a mere conversation.”292
To date, no defendant has claimed that a post-conviction DNA statute that
precludes pleading defendants from seeking relief violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
3. Non-DNA/Actual Innocence Statutes
Defendants have primarily made Equal Protection Clause challenges in the
actual innocence context in cases in which states only allow defendants to seek new
trials based on DNA evidence. None of these claims have been successful. For
instance, Ohioan Rachel Stull sought to present polygraph evidence which she
claimed proved her actual innocence of drug charges.293 Ohio’s post-conviction
statute, however, only allows defendants to prove actual innocence through DNA
testing results.294 Stull claimed that this statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
due to the disparate treatment of DNA and non-DNA evidence.295 Using the
rational basis test, the Court of Appeals of Ohio quickly concluded that there was
no Equal Protection violation because it was “unable to compare the reliability of
polygraph testing with that of DNA testing.”296
No defendant has yet claimed that a non-DNA actual innocence statute that
precludes pleading defendants from seeking relief violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
287.
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Id. at 345.
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Id.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 356–57.
State v. Stull, No. 27036, 2014 WL 1345303 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014).
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
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D. Conclusion
There are currently few constitutional avenues of relief available in states in
which pleading defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction DNA
testing or presenting non-DNA evidence of actual innocence. A few states have
found limited state substantive due process rights to relief, but the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Osborne rejected the notion of a federal substantive due process right to
post-conviction DNA testing. And, while Osborne recognized a limited procedural
due process right to post-conviction DNA testing, no court has since found that
right violated in either the DNA or non-DNA context. Finally, while some
defendants have brought successful Equal Protection Clause challenges to
post-conviction DNA statutes, a claim by a pleading defendant implicates neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect class. Therefore, if a defendant were to challenge a
pleading defendant prohibition in a post-conviction DNA or actual innocence
statute, the State would only need to point to one rational reason for limiting relief
to non-pleading defendants. As a result, if a court is to recognize a right to prove
innocence after pleading guilty, it likely has to come from another
constitutional guarantee.
III. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURTS
A. Introduction
As noted, the Supreme Court in Osborne recognized a limited procedural due
process right to post-conviction DNA testing, and courts have found that the Equal
Protection Clause provides a possible basis for relief from restrictive
post-conviction DNA and non-DNA statutes. While neither of these constitutional
protections is likely sufficient by itself to establish a right to prove innocence after
pleading guilty, this Article argues that a combination of the two is sufficient to
create such a right. Therefore, this Article explores a right that combines aspects of
procedural due process and equal protection: the right to access the courts.297
B. History of the Right to Access the Courts
The history of the right to access the courts (also known as the right of
meaningful access to the courts298) can be traced at least as far back as the Supreme
Court’s 1956 opinion in Griffin v. Illinois.299 In Griffin, indigent defendants Judson
Griffin and James Crenshaw were convicted of armed robbery and sought a free

297. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 573 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
procedural due process and equal protection threads of the right to access the courts are intertwined).
298. See, e.g., Schrier v. Halford, 60 F.3d 1309, 1310 (8th Cir. 1995).
299. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); see Eric Merriam, Non-Uniform Justice: An Equal
Protection Analysis of Veterans Treatment Courts’ Exclusionary Qualification Requirements, 84
MISS. L.J. 685, 705 (2015) (“Griffin has been cited as the first in a series of cases establishing an equal
protection-based fundamental right to ‘access the courts.’”).
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copy of the entire trial transcript to perfect their appeal.300 The trial court denied
their motion, making it impossible for the men to comply with Illinois
appellate procedure.301
Griffin and Crenshaw then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which, in a plurality opinion, acknowledged that states are under no federal
constitutional obligation to provide appellate courts or even any right to appellate
review.302 That said, the Court also recognized that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings,
including appeals.303 Therefore, according to the Court, once a state does provide
for appellate review, it cannot “do so in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty.”304 The Court was thus able to
conclude that Illinois’s appellate procedure violated the men’s constitutional rights
and was “a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law.”305
Six years later, the Supreme Court expanded upon this right to access the
courts in its 1963 opinion in Douglas v. California.306 In Douglas, indigent defendants
Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were convicted of thirteen felonies after a
jury trial and sought appointed counsel on appeal.307 Pursuant to a California rule,
when an appealing defendant made a request for counsel, the court was to conduct
an independent investigation of the record to determine whether appointing counsel
would benefit the defendant or the court.308 Finding no benefit in the case at hand,
the court declined to appoint counsel.309
Later, the United States Supreme Court reversed this decision, concluding that
the California rule did “not comport with fair procedure” and “lack[ed] that equality
demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”310 The problem with the rule,
according to the Court, was that “[t]he indigent, where the record is unclear or the
errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has
a meaningful appeal.”311
The Supreme Court later clarified this right to access the courts while refusing
to extend it in 1974. In Ross v. Moffitt, indigent defendant Fred Ross unsuccessfully
sought appointed counsel for his appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
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Id. at 353–54.
Id. at 354–55.
Id.
Id. at 357–58.
Id. at 358.

Second to Printer_Miller (Do Not Delete)

2/26/2020 1:32 PM

2020] WHY STATES MUST CONSIDER INNOCENCE CLAIMS

705

after losing his appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.312 He thereafter
appealed to the United State Supreme Court, which observed that “[t]he precise
rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated,
some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.”313
Specifically, the Due Process thread “emphasizes fairness between the State and the
individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same
situation may be treated.”314 Meanwhile, the Equal Protection thread “emphasizes
disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are
arguably indistinguishable.”315
Focusing primarily on the Equal Protection portion, the Court determined
that the analysis was “not one of absolutes, but one of degrees.”316 While equal
protection does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages, it does
require state appellate systems that are “free of unreasoned distinctions.”317 States
can therefore make reasoned distinctions among defendants but cannot create a
system that, for some defendants, entirely cuts off the ability to appeal or makes an
appeal a “meaningless ritual.”318 Applying these principles, the Court concluded that
the right to appointed counsel for trial and first appeal were sufficient to create a
record for review for the state supreme court.319 Therefore, the Court found that
Ross was not denied his right to access the Supreme Court of North Carolina.320
The United States Supreme Court and lower courts have since applied this
right to access the courts in a variety of contexts. As in Griffin and Douglas, some of
these cases involved indigent defendants. In Burns v. Ohio, the Court held that
indigent defendants must be allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions
without payment of docket fees.321 And, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court found that a
Mississippi law requiring an indigent mother to pay record preparation fees in
advance of her parental rights appeal violated the right to access the
appellate court.322
Courts have also applied the right to access the courts outside the indigency
context. The most famous of these cases is the United States Supreme Court case,
Bounds v. Smith.323 In Bounds, North Carolina inmates claimed that they were denied
their right to access the courts based upon “the State’s failure to provide legal
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Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
Id. at 608–09.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966)).
Id. (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)).
Id. at 614–16.
Id.
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959).
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996).
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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research facilities.”324 The Supreme Court began its analysis by tracing the history
of the right to access the courts and noted that “[m]ore recent decisions have struck
down restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to
the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”325
The Court then observed that the right also “require[s] States to shoulder
affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts.”326
According to the Court, “[t]his is not to say that economic factors may not be
considered, for example, in choosing the methods used to provide meaningful
access. But the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total
denial.”327 Ultimately, the Court concluded that “[t]he inquiry is . . . whether law
libraries or other forms of legal assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts.”328
The Court then resolved this inquiry by turning aside the State’s citation to
Ross v. Moffitt. The State argued that if defendants were not entitled to appointed
counsel for discretionary appeals to state supreme courts, then they were also not
entitled to adequate law libraries or assistance from persons trained in the law.329
The Supreme Court rejected this argument by noting that an appeal to a state
supreme court (1) was previously litigated in lower court(s), (2) likely already has
appellate briefs, and (3) “is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the
judgment below.”330
The Court found the facts of the Bounds case distinguishable because they were
largely “original actions seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication
of fundamental civil rights. Rather than presenting claims that have been passed on
by two courts, they frequently raise heretofore unlitigated issues.”331 Simply put,
“[t]he need for new legal research or advice to make a meaningful initial presentation
to a trial court in such a case is far greater than is required to file an adequate petition
for discretionary review.”332 Therefore, the Court concluded “that the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.”333
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C. Halbert v. Michigan and Pleading vs. Non-Pleading Defendants
Another United States Supreme Court opinion that was able to distinguish
Ross v. Moffitt provides the strongest support for the proposition that the right to
access the courts applies to pleading defendants seeking to prove their innocence
through DNA and non-DNA evidence of actual innocence. In Halbert v. Michigan,
Antonio Halbert, an indigent man, pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of criminal
sexual conduct in 2001.334 In 1994, Michigan had amended its state constitution so
that “an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave
of the court.”335 Therefore, while the Court of Appeals of Michigan had to hear an
appeal by a defendant found guilty after a trial, it now had discretion over whether
to hear an appeal by a defendant who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.336
Michigan judges thereafter began denying appellate counsel to indigent
defendants who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere and were seeking leave to appeal
to the Court of Appeals of Michigan, concluding that Ross v. Moffitt applies to all
discretionary appeals.337 After being denied appointed counsel under this logic,
Halbert appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that Douglas
v. California should apply to all first appeals, regardless of whether they are
discretionary or mandatory.338
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Halbert. The Court reached this
conclusion because (1) the Court of Appeals of Michigan considers the merits of
the claims in motions for leave to appeal; and (2) “indigent defendants pursuing
first-tier review in the Court of Appeals are generally ill equipped to represent
themselves.”339 Therefore, denying indigent pleading defendants the right to
counsel would functionally deny them their right to appeal under Michigan’s
constitution because “a pro se applicant’s entitlement to seek leave to appeal to
Michigan’s intermediate court may be more formal than real.”340
Accordingly, the Court found that Michigan’s disparate treatment of pleading
and non-pleading defendants violated the right to access the courts.341 The Court
was able to reach this conclusion despite acknowledging a rational countervailing
state interest, noting that “[w]hile the State has a legitimate interest in reducing the
workload of its judiciary, providing indigents with appellate counsel will yield
applications easier to comprehend.”342 Moreover, Michigan’s constitutional
amendment still provided for a reasoned distinction by requiring the court to hear
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Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 609 (2005).
Id. (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20).
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appeals by non-pleading defendants but allowing the court to issue summary denials
of leave to appeal in cases of pleading defendants.343
While Halbert involved issues of indigency, the Court concluded its opinion
with a final footnote explaining that the right to access the courts applies in any case
in which a state treats pleading defendants differently from non-pleading defendants
in the appellate context. In that footnote, the Court noted that “[w]e are
unpersuaded by the suggestion that, because a defendant may be able to waive his
right to appeal entirely, Michigan can consequently exact from him a waiver of the
right to government-funded appellate counsel.”344 The Court found that such a
waiver would similarly violate the right to access the courts because “if Michigan
were to require defendants to waive all forms of appeal as a condition of entering a
plea, that condition would operate against moneyed and impoverished defendants
alike.”345 The Court of Appeals of Michigan later used this footnote to find that a
plea conditioned on waiver of appointed counsel on appeal violated the right to
access the courts, concluding that “[t]his language [from Halbert] unambiguously
indicates that the United States Supreme Court would hold unconstitutional the
practice of imposing a waiver of appointed appellate counsel as a plea condition.”346
The dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas in Halbert reinforces the
conclusions that (1) the opinion was not solely or principally about indigency; and
(2) states cannot grant non-pleading defendants a right to appeal while wholly
denying that same right to pleading defendants. According to Justice Thomas,
“Michigan has not engaged in the sort of invidious discrimination against indigent
defendants that Douglas condemns.”347 Instead, Justice Thomas argued that
“Michigan has done no more than recognize the undeniable difference between
defendants who plead guilty and those who maintain their innocence . . . .”348
Justice Thomas claimed that affording appellate counsel to non-pleading
defendants while denying appellate counsel to pleading defendants was a reasoned
distinction for two related reasons. First, “because a defendant who pleads guilty
‘may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea’ . . . the
potential issues that can be raised on appeal are more limited.”349 Second, Michigan
amended its Constitution to deny pleading defendants the right to appointed
counsel after nearly one third of its civil and criminal appeals were brought by
pleading defendants, with “few of these defendants [being] granted relief on
appeal.”350 Justice Thomas therefore asserted that the majority’s extension of the
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right to appellate counsel to pleading defendants would (1) clog court dockets,
(2) shift resources from defendants who maintained their innocence to defendants
who admitted their guilt, and (3) not remedy many wrongful convictions.351
IV. A RIGHT TO PROVE INNOCENCE AFTER PLEADING GUILTY
A. Introduction
This Section argues that Halbert and the right to access the courts compel the
conclusion that courts cannot continue to allow non-pleading defendants to seek
post-conviction DNA testing and present non-DNA evidence of actual innocence
while denying similar rights to pleading defendants. It begins by discussing why and
how the right to access the courts should apply in the post-conviction context and
proceeds to explain why state post-conviction DNA and non-DNA statutes should
contain
minimal
reasoned
distinctions
between
pleading
and
non-pleading defendants.
B. Establishing a Right to Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty
As noted in the previous Section, the right to access the courts recognizes that
states are under no federal constitutional obligation to provide appellate courts or
even any right to appellate review.352 Once a state does provide for appellate review,
however, it can make reasoned distinctions between defendants but cannot create a
system that, for some defendants, entirely cuts off the ability to appeal or makes an
appeal a “meaningless ritual.”353 In Halbert, the Court then applied this right to
pleading defendants, concluding that (1) making appeals by non-pleading
defendants mandatory but appeals by pleading defendants discretionary was a
reasoned distinction; but that (2) the failure to afford pleading defendants the right
to appellate counsel made their entitlement to seek leave to appeal “more formal
than real” and deprived them of their right to access the courts.354
The Court in Halbert was not explicit about how Michigan’s refusal to appoint
appellate counsel to pleading defendants implicated both the Due Process and
Equal Protection threads of the right to access the courts,355 but its reasoning seems
easily explicable. The Halbert Court noted that the Due Process thread of the right
to access the courts focuses on “the essential fairness of the state-ordered
proceedings.”356 In the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the Supreme Court
has held that “the violation of the right to counsel render[s] [a] proceeding

351. Id. at 630–31.
352. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
353. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
355. See Halbert, 545 U.S. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority does not say where in
the Constitution that right is located—the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or some
purported confluence of the two.”).
356. Id. at 611 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)).
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presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent.”357 For example, assume that
(1) corrupt police officers fail to secure a search warrant before searching a
defendant’s house and uncovering drugs; and (2) defense counsel neither moves for
a suppression hearing nor cross-examines the officers at trial. In such a case, the
defendant would have a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because his
suppression hearing was nonexistent and his trial was unreliable.358
Courts have applied a similar analysis in cases involving proceedings in which
the right to counsel comes from the Due Process Clause, such as deportation
proceedings.359 In Halbert, this analysis would explain the Due Process portion of
why the right to access the courts required appointed counsel for pleading
defendants. Under this analysis, the Court’s conclusion would be that the denial of
appointed counsel to pleading defendants meant that their appellate proceeding was
(1) nonexistent if the lack of counsel led to the Court of Appeals of Michigan
denying leave to appeal, or (2) unreliable if the defendant were forced to represent
himself at his appellate proceeding if leave to appeal were granted.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection thread of
the right to access the courts “emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.”360 By holding
that Michigan could not withhold the right to appellate counsel to pleading
defendants, the Halbert Court clearly held that pleading and non-pleading
defendants seeking to appeal are in indistinguishable situations.
This same reasoning applies in the actual innocence context with even fuller
force. Every state has provided for appellate review through post-conviction DNA
testing statutes,361 and many states have provided for appellate review through
freestanding actual innocence statutes that allow for the presentation of non-DNA
evidence.362 Therefore, the right to access the courts compels the conclusion that
these states can create reasoned distinctions between pleading and non-pleading
defendants but cannot practically or actually cut off any right for pleading
defendants to appeal.
In this regard, the right to access the courts claim by pleading defendants in
the actual innocence context is actually stronger than the claim by the pleading
defendant in Halbert. The Michigan statute in Halbert practically, but did not
actually, cut off the right for pleading defendants to appeal. Pleading defendants
could still file for leave to appeal in Michigan; they simply had to do so without the
357. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000).
358. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (finding that trial counsel’s failure to
move to suppress a bedsheet with physical evidence that was seized without warrant in a rape case was
deficient performance).
359. See, e.g., Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“We . . . conclude that the holding of Flores-Ortega applies with equal force to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel arising out of the Fifth Amendment right to due process.”).
360. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
361. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
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assistance of counsel. This might have been seen as a “meaningless ritual,” but it
was at least a ritual that could have led to relief.
Conversely, in states that preclude pleading defendants from seeking DNA
testing or presenting freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA
evidence, there is not even a ritual. Imagine a case in which an African American
defendant who pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting and murdering a brunette
woman (1) seeks DNA testing of blond hairs with follicles found on the victim’s
underpants, or (2) seeks to present a surveillance video of a Caucasian man entering
the victim’s house minutes before the crimes occurred. Even in a case in which this
evidence did not surface until after the defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant would
be per se prohibited from seeking such testing or presenting such evidence in a
number of states across the country.363 Therefore, in these states, pleading
defendants are denied both meaningful and actual access to the courts. Pleading
defendants in states with pleading defendant prohibitions always have a nonexistent
appellate proceeding under the Due Process thread, and, under the Equal
Protection thread, they are wholly denied avenues of relief that are readily available
to non-pleading defendants.
This conclusion is also supported by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bounds
v. Smith, which distinguished its prior opinion in Ross v. Moffitt. As noted, in Moffitt,
the Court decided that the refusal to appoint counsel for a defendant’s appeal to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina did not violate the right to access the courts.364
Conversely, in Bounds, the United States Supreme Court found that the right to
access the courts required the availability of adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law for prisoners pursuing “original actions
seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil
rights . . . rais[ing] heretofore unlitigated issues.”365 This conclusion allowed the
Court to distinguish Moffitt, which involved an appeal to a state supreme court that
(1) was previously litigated in lower court(s); (2) already had appellate briefs; and (3)
“[wa]s not primarily concerned with the correctness of the judgment below.”366
Post-conviction claims based on DNA and non-DNA evidence of actual
innocence are similar to the appeal in Bounds and different than the appeal in Moffitt.
By definition, (1) they are original actions seeking release from confinement
and/or a new trial, (2) they raise previously unlitigated issues, (3) they never have
prior appellate briefs, and (4) they are centrally concerned with the correctness of
the judgment below.367 Furthermore, the claim by pleading defendants in the actual
innocence context is stronger than the claim by the defendants in Bounds, who were
merely practically but not actually denied their right to access the courts.
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See supra Section I.B.3.b.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 615–16.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977).
Id.
See generally Brooks & Simpson, supra note 16.
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There is reason to believe that courts could adopt this reasoning in future cases
based upon past precedent. As noted, in the pre-Osborne case, Wade v. Brady, a
federal district court found that a defendant has a substantive due process right to
post-conviction DNA testing.368 In the alternative, the court found that precluding
the defendant from seeking post-conviction DNA testing violated his right to access
the courts.369 The court began by detailing the history of the right and its application
in cases dealing with the right to law libraries and appellate counsel.370 It then
concluded that “[d]enying prisoners access to potentially exculpatory DNA
evidence limits meaningful access to the courts in even more profound terms than
denying access to a law library or attorney.”371 Specifically, “[w]hile the latter
restrictions substantially impinge on a prisoner’s ability to gain judicial access, the
former operates as an absolute bar.”372
Indeed, in the Osborne case itself, the defendant made both substantive due
process and right to access the courts claims in the Ninth Circuit. But, because the
court found a substantive due process right to post-conviction DNA testing, it
concluded that it did not need to “reach Osborne’s alternative argument[ ] that the
State’s denial of access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence is effectively a
denial of meaningful access to courts.”373 As a result, when the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s substantive due process conclusion, it never addressed
whether Alaska’s post-conviction DNA testing statute implicated the right to access
the courts.
In the wake of Osborne, two federal circuit courts have touched upon this right
to access the courts in the DNA context without providing resolution. The first
court was the Second Circuit in the aforementioned McKithen case. As noted, Frank
McKithen brought a Federal § 1983 claim, alleging that the application of New
York’s post-conviction DNA statute to preclude him from testing crime scene
evidence violated his right to substantive due process.374 McKithen also claimed a
violation of his right to access the courts.375
In an odd move, Judge Gleeson of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District Court converted McKithen’s claim. According to Judge Gleeson:
As any evidence entitling McKithen to relief under [New York’s
post-conviction statute] would necessarily undermine confidence in the
outcome of trial and thus be necessary for meaningful access to existing
clemency mechanisms, I will consider the contours of the right of

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Osborne III, 521 F.3d 1118, 1142 (9th Cir. 2008).
McKithen I, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id.
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meaningful access to clemency mechanisms instead of the right of
meaningful access to courts.376
Having converted the claim, Judge Gleeson made liberal reference to Halbert
v. Michigan in finding that the New York courts violated McKithen’s “right of
meaningful access to clemency mechanisms.”377 Judge Gleeson found that “Halbert
provides strong support for my conclusion that the right of meaningful access to
existing clemency mechanisms entails the right to certain evidence of innocence.”378
While Judge Gleeson noted that the right to seek leave to appeal was mandatory in
Halbert as opposed to the inherently discretionary nature of clemency proceedings,
he concluded that an analogy could be found between the two:
Though clemency proceedings are not exclusively or even primarily
“error-correction” proceedings, and often turn not on a revisitation of the
facts underlying a conviction, but on an analysis of a defendant’s contrition
and personality, they nevertheless have one significant, even if
discretionary, error-correcting function: they are the last resort for the
wrongfully convicted.379
It is unclear why Judge Gleeson didn’t simply find that the New York courts
violated McKithen’s right to access the courts by applying the state’s
post-conviction DNA statute to prevent him from seeking testing that could have
been used to prove his actual innocence at a post-conviction proceeding. Such a
proceeding would (1) be held in a literal court of last resort, (2) be an
“error-correction” proceeding, and (3) turn on a revisitation of the facts underlying
his conviction. In other words, a post-conviction proceeding would have been a
much closer analog to the appellate proceeding in Halbert than a non-judicial
clemency proceeding.
But, for whatever reason, Judge Gleeson converted McKithen’s claim and
granted him relief. This created two problems for McKithen during the State’s
appeal to the Second Circuit. First, McKithen did not cross-appeal the district
court’s conversion of his “right to access the courts” claim, which the Second
Circuit deemed a constructive denial of that claim.380 Therefore, the Second Circuit
did not address that claim on appeal.381
Second, the right recognized by Judge Gleeson—the “right of meaningful
access to clemency mechanisms”—is a nonexistent right.382 In Osborne, part of the
defendant’s substantive due process claim was that he had a liberty interest in “the
Governor’s constitutional authority to ‘grant pardons, commutations, and
376. Id. at 479.
377. Id. at 470–72.
378. Id. at 471.
379. Id. at 471.
380. See McKithen II, 626 F.3d 143, 155 (2nd Cir. 2010) (“McKithen’s substantive due process,
access to the courts, and confrontation clause claims were denied by the District Court and McKithen
has not appealed them.”).
381. Id.
382. Id.
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reprieves.’”383 The Supreme Court held that this “claim can be readily disposed of”
because “noncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in traditional state
executive clemency, to which no particular claimant is entitled as a matter of state
law.”384 Therefore, the defendant in Osborne could not “challenge the
constitutionality of any procedures available to vindicate an interest in
state clemency.”385
This reasoning from Osborne made it easy for the Second Circuit in McKithen
to reverse Judge Gleeson’s ruling. The court quickly concluded that “the District
Court’s holding that a prisoner has a liberty interest in meaningful access to state
clemency mechanisms does not survive Osborne.”386 As a result, neither court ended
up addressing the question of whether there was a violation of McKithen’s right to
access the courts.
The second federal circuit court to touch upon the right to access the courts
in the post-conviction DNA context was the Eleventh Circuit in Cunningham
v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia County.387 In Cunningham, Dewayne
Cunningham was convicted of first-degree rape in Alabama after a jury trial and
later sought “DNA and mitochondrial DNA testing on the condom wrapper found
in the park and on pubic hairs and fingernail scrapings that were recovered from
Brown during the sexual assault examination.”388 Cunningham, however, went
directly to federal court because he thought that proceeding in state court would be
futile.389 As noted, Alabama’s post-conviction DNA testing statute arguably only
applies in capital cases,390 and Cunningham received, and was only eligible for, a life
sentence.391 Part of Cunningham’s claim was that Alabama’s statute denied him his
right to access the courts.392
The Eleventh Circuit effectively bypassed this claim. It acknowledged that
Alabama’s post-conviction DNA testing statute—Section 15-18-200 of the
Alabama Code—only allows for DNA testing in capital cases.393 But it then noted
that another section of the Alabama Code allows any defendant “to ‘institute a
proceeding’ to secure relief ‘on the ground that . . . [n]ewly discovered material facts
exist’ which require that the conviction be vacated.”394 Based upon finding that this
section could potentially provide an unexplored avenue for relief for Cunningham,

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Osborne IV, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009).
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
McKithen II, 626 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Off. for Escambia Cty., 592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1253.
See id. at 1272.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 1271–72.
Id.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
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the court held that it did not need to address whether Section 15-18-200 violated
his right to access the courts.395
Thus, while the right to access the courts was part of Osborne and two
post-Osborne cases, none of those courts ended up answering the question of
whether it applies to defendants seeking post-conviction DNA testing. That said, it
is likely that none of those cases were good candidates for application of the right
to access the courts because the defendants in all three cases likely would have failed
under the Equal Protection thread: (1) Osborne was distinguishable from
defendants who exercised due diligence under Alaska’s DNA statute; (2) McKithen
was distinguishable from defendants who established the reasonable probability that
the results of DNA testing would have resulted in a more favorable verdict; and (3)
Cunningham was arguably distinguishable from defendants who were convicted of
more serious crimes with more serious penalties.396
Conversely, in a state like Pennsylvania, assume that two defendants are
convicted of third-degree murder, given the same sentence, and diligently present
post-conviction claims for DNA testing based on crime scene evidence that clearly
could establish their innocence. If one of these defendants pleaded guilty, they could
not seek testing; if the other one was found guilty after a trial, he could seek
testing.397 Pursuant to Halbert, these two individuals are similarly situated, and
preventing the pleading defendant from seeking relief violates the right to access
the courts.
C. Feasibility and Mechanics of a Right to Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty
1. Introduction
Judges in New York and Maryland have questioned whether it is feasible to
have pleading defendants bring freestanding claims of actual innocence based on
DNA and/or non-DNA evidence. As noted, in the Tiger case, the Court of Appeals
of New York found that allowing pleading defendants to collaterally attack their
convictions with evidence of actual innocence would contradict the finality that
results from the plea process that is “integral to the criminal justice system.”398
Moreover, in the aforementioned Jamison case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected the defendant’s claim that the Strickland v. Washington test for determining
whether new trials should be granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel
could be applied in cases of pleading defendants seeking to prove their actual
395. Id. at 1268–69.
396. Cf. State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1266 (Kan. 2004) (finding that rape and aggravated
criminal sodomy were not crimes of differing severity for Equal Protection purposes).
397. For example, William M. Kelly, Jr., a mentally ill man, pleaded guilty to third-degree murder
in 1990 and was later able to obtain DNA testing that proved his innocence in 1993. See Innocence
Project, William M. Kelly, Jr., N AT’ L R EGISTRY E XONERATIONS , http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid= [ https://perma.cc/2E6K-2824 ] ( last visited July
30, 2018 ).
398. People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 515 (N.Y. 2018).
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innocence.399 It turns out, however, that these cases actually support the feasibility
and desirability of a right to prove innocence after pleading guilty.
a. Statutes and Case Law
First, as noted, (1) the Maryland legislature passed a bill on April 18, 2018,
allowing pleading defendants to bring freestanding actual innocence claims based
on DNA and non-DNA evidence;400 and (2) New York recently amended its
post-conviction statute to allow pleading defendants to seek post-conviction DNA
testing.401 These laws indicate that the legislatures in both states thought that it was
feasible for courts to adjudicate actual innocence petitions by pleading defendants.
The New York legislature’s decision was later validated in 2014 when Josue Ortiz,
who suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, sought DNA testing after
pleading guilty to manslaughter in connection with the deaths of two brothers in
2004.402 That testing linked three other men to the killings; those men eventually
pleaded guilty to the killings, and Ortiz’s convictions were vacated.403
Ortiz was not the only pleading defendant exonerated in 2014. Forty-seven
exonerees in 2014 were individuals who had been convicted after guilty pleas, a
record number404 that would soon be surpassed in 2015 and again in 2016.405 These
exonerations in and of themselves are evidence of the feasibility of a right to prove
innocence after pleading guilty.
b. Mechanics of a Right to Prove Innocence After Pleading Guilty
Second, Supreme Court precedent in both the ineffective assistance and Brady
v. Maryland contexts as well as post-conviction statutes in states like Texas establish
the mechanics of a right to prove innocence after pleading guilty. In Strickland
v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that a defendant proves a case of ineffective
assistance of counsel by establishing (1) deficient performance, i.e., that defense
counsel’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and
(2) prejudice, i.e., “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”406

399. Jamison v. State, 148 A.3d 1267, 1283–84 (Md. 2016).
400. See Mann, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
401. See Brim v. State, 969 So.2d 552, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
402. See Maurice Possley, Josue Ortiz, N AT ’ L R EGISTRY E XONERATIONS , http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4633 [ https://perma.cc/T9
BB-RXSN ] ( last updated Apr. 19, 2017 ).
403. Id.
404. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2014, at 3 (2015), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/7U6Z-A59M ].
405. See infra notes 465–66 and accompanying text.
406. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984).
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In Jamison, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that this test cannot
apply to pleading defendants in the actual innocence context because the
defendant’s plea deprives the prosecution of a trial and leaves the post-conviction
court with nothing against which to weigh the defendant’s DNA or non-DNA
evidence of actual innocence.407 The court failed to acknowledge, however, that the
Supreme Court has applied the ineffective assistance of counsel test and its
prejudice prong to pleading defendants for decades.
In its 1985 opinion in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court held “that the two-part
Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.”408 Adopting an approach already taken by several federal
circuit courts, the Supreme Court concluded that a pleading defendant satisfies
Strickland’s prejudice prong by showing “that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.”409
The Court then noted that “[i]n many guilty plea cases, the ‘prejudice’ inquiry
will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing
ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial.”410 To
illustrate this inquiry, the Court gave an example:
[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover
potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error
“prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go
to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would
have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This
assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.411
This inquiry is easily adaptable to the actual innocence context. Recall the
hypothetical in which an African American man pleads guilty to sexually assaulting
and murdering a brunette woman only to find out later that blond hairs with follicles
were discovered on the victim’s underpants. If DNA testing revealed that the hairs
likely came from a serial killer in the area who was unknown to the defendant, it is
probable that, if this testing had been done earlier, (1) the defendant would neither
have pleaded guilty nor been told to plead guilty; and (2) the jury would not have
convicted him. Conversely, if DNA testing revealed that the hairs likely came from
the defendant’s best friend and alleged accomplice in the crime, it is likely that
(1) the defendant would have pleaded guilty and been told to plead guilty; and
(2) the jury would have convicted him if he instead proceeded to trial.

407. Jamison v. State, 148 A.3d 1267, 1281–82 (Md. 2016). But see id. at 1285 (McDonald, J.,
dissenting) (“A court that is capable of assessing the effect of evidence on the outcome of a hypothetical
trial for one purpose can surely do it for the other.”).
408. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
409. Id. at 59.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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The argument that the Strickland inquiry is easily adaptable to the actual
innocence context is not merely theoretical; it is the inquiry already being used by
states like Texas that allow pleading defendants to present freestanding claims of
actual innocence. For instance, in Lampkin v. State, the defendant was able to seek
post-conviction DNA testing of the victim’s underwear despite pleading guilty to
sexually assaulting her; that testing excluded the defendant as the source of DNA
recovered from the panties.412 The defendant then argued that if the DNA test
results had been available earlier, “he would not have pleaded guilty and would not
have been convicted by a jury.”413 The Court of Appeals of Texas, however, denied
the defendant a new trial because (1) the victim said she recognized his voice from
prior interactions with him; (2) the victim had intercourse with her boyfriend six to
eight hours before the assault; and (3) the victim said her assailant did not have an
erection and might not have “had a climax.”414 Based on this evidence, the court
rejected the defendant’s claim that “he would not have pleaded guilty and would
not have been convicted by a jury” if the DNA testing had been done before his
guilty plea.415
This is not to say that the Jamison court’s concern about the difficulty of
assessing prejudice in the absence of a trial is unfounded. But the Strickland test
provides a clear roadmap regarding how to determine prejudice for pleading
defendants in the actual innocence context. On June 5, 2018, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina held in dicta that pleading defendants should be able to seek
post-conviction DNA testing.416 In doing so, the court “acknowledge[d] the
inherent difficulty in establishing the materiality required by [North Carolina’s
post-conviction statute] for a defendant who pleaded guilty.”417 But the court
ultimately found that the test should be the same as the Strickland test: the defendant
must establish that he “would not have pleaded guilty and otherwise would not have
been found guilty.”418 According to the court, in such cases, “[t]he trial court is
obligated to consider the facts surrounding a defendant’s decision to plead guilty in
addition to other evidence, in the context of the entire record of the case, in order
to determine whether the evidence is ‘material.’”419
This is the same approach taken by courts considering Brady claims by
pleading defendants. As noted, in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors have an obligation under the Due Process Clause to turn over material
exculpatory evidence, i.e., evidence that creates the reasonable probability of a
412. Lampkin v. State, No. 11-14-00038-CR, 2015 WL 4734028, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 6, 2015).
413. Id. at *2.
414. Id. at *1.
415. Id. at *2.
416. See State v. Randall, 817 S.E.2d 219, 221 (N.C. App. 2018) (“[W]e do not believe that the
statute was intended to completely forestall the filing of a such a motion where a defendant did, in fact,
enter a plea of guilty.”).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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different outcome.420 In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court upheld a
defendant’s waiver of her right to material impeachment evidence largely because
the prosecution agreed to disclose “any information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant.”421 Since Ruiz, a number of courts have (1) found that
pleading defendants have a Brady right to evidence of actual innocence; and
(2) determined whether that right was violated by doing a quasi-Strickland
analysis.422
In Buffey v. Ballard, Joseph Buffey pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault
and one count of robbery in West Virginia pursuant to a plea agreement.423 Before
Buffey entered his plea, the State failed to disclose that a lieutenant had reached the
following conclusion regarding DNA testing: “[A]ssuming there are only two
contributors (including [the victim]), Joseph Buffey is excluded as the donor of the
seminal fluid identified [from the rape kit] cuttings.”424
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the State’s failure
to disclose this evidence was a Brady violation by concluding that, if this evidence
had been disclosed, (1) Buffey would neither have pleaded guilty nor been told to
plead guilty; and (2) the jury would not have convicted him.425 With regard to the
first part of the analysis, the court credited post-conviction testimony by Buffey and
his attorney that Buffey would have proceeded to trial if he knew about the DNA
evidence.426 And, with regard to the second part of the analysis, the court concluded
that “[i]f this case had proceeded to trial, the DNA evidence could have been used
by the Petitioner to cast a reasonable doubt upon his guilt on the sexual
assault charges.”427
Buffey reveals how courts can assess post-conviction claims of actual innocence
by pleading defendants. Assume the same facts as in Buffey, except for the fact that
the rape kit was lost at the time of Buffey’s plea and not discovered for another
decade. If testing of that kit excluded Buffey as the source of the DNA, the court
could have conducted the same analysis and concluded that, if this testing had been
done before Buffey’s plea, (1) Buffey would have neither pleaded guilty nor been
told to plead guilty; and (2) the jury would not have convicted him.
This was the result that occurred in the case of Larry Bostic, a Florida man
who pleaded guilty to a rape in 1989. While Florida initially did not allow pleading
defendants to seek post-conviction DNA testing, it changed the law in 2006. Testing
in 2007 excluded Bostic as the source of DNA evidence from the victim’s
underwear and rape kit, leading to his release.428
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).
See, e.g., Garcia v. Hudak, 156 F. Supp. 3d 907, 915–16 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 206 (W. Va. 2015).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 220–21.
Id.
Id.
See Maurice Possley, Larry Bostic, N AT ’L REGISTRY E XONERATIONS , http://
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c. Missouri v. Frye and Expanding Constitutional Challenges to Guilty Pleas
There is a third and final reason that the cases from Maryland and New York
support the feasibility and desirability of a right to prove innocence after pleading
guilty. As noted, (1) the Court of Appeals of Maryland questioned the feasibility of
adapting the Strickland test to actual innocence claims by pleading defendants
because of the lack of a trial record; and (2) the Court of Appeals of New York
found that allowing pleading defendants to bring actual innocence claims would
undermine the plea process that is so critical to the criminal justice system.
Both of these claims, however, are belied by the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Missouri v. Frye.429 In Frye, the prosecution made two unanswered plea offers to
Galin Frye, who ended up pleading guilty, without a plea agreement, to driving with
a revoked license.430 Frye later appealed, claiming that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney did not inform him of the plea offers.431
The State responded that Frye’s case was distinguishable from Hill v. Lockhart,
which addressed the question of “whether there was ineffective assistance leading
to acceptance of a plea offer, a process involving a formal court appearance with
the defendant and all counsel present.”432 In such cases, both the State and the trial
court have a “substantial opportunity” to prevent subsequent claims of ineffective
assistance “by establishing at the plea entry proceeding that the defendant has been
given proper advice or, if the advice received appears to have been inadequate, to
remedy that deficiency before the plea is accepted and the conviction entered.”433
Conversely, “[w]hen a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected, . . . no formal
court proceedings are involved,” and “discussions between client and defense
counsel are privileged.”434 As a result, “the prosecution has little or no notice if
something may be amiss and perhaps no capacity to intervene in any event.”435
Accordingly, the State argued that “it is unfair to subject it to the consequences of
defense counsel’s inadequacies, especially when the opportunities for a full and fair
trial, or, as here, for a later guilty plea albeit on less favorable terms,
are preserved.”436
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the State’s arguments had some
“persuasive force” but found that they did “not suffice to overcome a simple
reality”: that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent
of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”437 The Court thus found that it
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3036 [ https://perma.cc/VP
7J-SBG4 ] ( last updated Aug. 23, 2014 ).
429. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
430. Id. at 138–39.
431. Id. at 139.
432. Id. at 142.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 143.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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had to extend the right to the effective assistance of counsel to rejected plea
agreements because “plea bargains have become so central to the administration of
the criminal justice system.”438
Having extended the right, the Court concluded that something like the
prejudice test from Hill v. Lockhart applied to a rejected plea bargain, with the key
questions being (1) whether the defendant would have accepted the plea bargain if
properly advised by his attorney; and (2) whether an intervening event would have
prevented the plea agreement from taking effect.439 And, with regard to the second
question, the Court found that the absence of a plea proceeding was not a
significant roadblock for determining prejudice. According to the Court, “in most
instances it should not be difficult to make an objective assessment as to whether
or not a particular fact or intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal
course, to cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a
plea bargain.”440
The Frye opinion resolves the concerns of the New York and Maryland courts.
In Tiger, the Court of Appeals of New York used the fact that the plea process has
become integral to the American criminal justice system to inoculate guilty pleas
from post-conviction claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence.441
But Frye stands for the opposite proposition that the importance of the plea process
means that pleading defendants should more readily be allowed to challenge the
propriety of their pleas.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Jamison concluded that the
lack of a trial record made the Strickland standard impossible to apply in cases of
pleading defendants.442 In Frye, the Court acknowledged the potential difficulty in
determining prejudice with regard to a plea offer that was not the subject of a plea
proceeding.443 But the Frye Court ultimately concluded that this concern was not
enough to overcome the simple fact that pleas have come to dominate the American
criminal justice system, meaning that constitutional protections must be adapted to
cover pleading defendants.444 Similar reasoning compels the conclusion that
defendants should have the right to prove innocence after pleading guilty based
upon the right to access the courts.

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 516–17 (N.Y. 2018).
Jamison v. State, 148 A.3d 1267, 1281–83 (Md. 2016).
Frye, 566 U.S. at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
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D. Reasoned Distinctions
1. Possible Reasoned Distinctions in the Actual Innocence Context
As the Supreme Court initially noted in Ross v. Moffitt, the right to access the
courts obligates the states to create appellate systems that are free from “unreasoned
distinctions.”445 That said, as the Court later noted in Halbert, states can include
reasoned distinctions such as Michigan’s constitutional amendment that made
appeals by pleading defendants discretionary despite the fact that appeals by
non-pleading defendants were mandatory.446 The State cannot, however, create a
system that, for some defendants, entirely cuts off the ability to appeal or makes an
appeal a “meaningless ritual.”447 If states were to recognize a right to prove
innocence after pleading guilty, the question becomes whether they could or should
recognize reasoned distinctions between pleading and non-pleading defendants
under their actual innocence statutes.
It is easy to imagine a few reasoned distinctions that states could proffer in the
actual innocence context that would not wholly cut off the right to appeal for
pleading defendants. First, states could change the burden of proof for pleading
defendants. As one example, states that require defendants to establish a reasonable
probability that DNA testing will prove their innocence could require pleading
defendants to make such a showing by clear and convincing evidence.448 Second,
states could adopt a version of Texas’s post-conviction law, which (1) requires a
defendant to prove that identity was in issue to seek DNA testing, but (2) prohibits
a court from relying solely on a guilty plea to conclude that identity was not in
issue.449 Under Texas’s statute, a court can still use a defendant’s plea as some
evidence that identity was not in issue, and courts or legislatures in other states could
find that guilty pleas create a rebuttable presumption that identity was not in issue.
Third, states could adopt a version of Alaska’s post-conviction law, which allows
for post-conviction DNA testing if “the applicant did not admit or concede guilt
under oath in an official proceeding for the offense . . . except that the court, in the
interest of justice, may waive this requirement.”450

445. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
446. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 612 (2005).
447. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
448. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.73.010 (West 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240
(2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk (West 2019);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4133 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 925.11–.12 (West 2019); see also supra
notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
449. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (West 2019); see also notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
450. ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.020(3) (2010). “Confusingly, the statute also states DNA testing is
available only if ‘the applicant was convicted after a trial and the identity of the perpetrator was a
disputed issue in the trial,’ leaving open the question whether an individual who pled guilty may be
granted relief under this section—because the guilty plea means there was no trial and no issue to
dispute.” Brooks & Simpson, supra note 16, at 861 n.408.
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2. The Justifications for the Reasoned Distinctions in Halbert
This distinction in Alaska’s post-conviction DNA law is most similar to the
Michigan constitutional amendment making appeals by pleading defendants
discretionary in Halbert. There are good reasons to believe, however, that the type
of appeal in Halbert is meaningfully different from an actual innocence appeal in a
way that militates against distinctions between pleading and non-pleading
defendants in the latter context. While the Halbert majority was not explicit about
why Michigan’s constitutional amendment regarding mandatory versus
discretionary appeals was a reasoned distinction between pleading and non-pleading
defendants, Justice Thomas’s dissent explained what Michigan was thinking. First,
as Justice Thomas noted, “because a defendant who pleads guilty ‘may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea,’ . . . the potential issues that
can be raised on appeal are more limited.”451 Justice Thomas was citing to a Supreme
Court of Michigan opinion,452 which in turn was citing the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in Tollett v. Henderson.453 In turn, the Henderson Court cited a trilogy
of Supreme Court opinions for the holding that,
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded
it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which
he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to
the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of
the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character
of the guilty plea . . . .454
This limitation on the types of constitutional challenges that can be brought
by pleading defendants provides two explanations for why Michigan made appeals
by pleading defendants discretionary. The first explanation is that the types of
appeals by pleading defendants that Michigan made discretionary are frequently not
about the actual innocence of the defendant. This fact is illustrated by two of the
most important Supreme Court opinions in this area.
First, in Boykin v. Alabama, Edward Boykin, Jr. pleaded guilty to five counts
of common law robbery, which was a capital offense at the time.455 Later, Boykin
successfully appealed, claiming that his plea was involuntary, not because he was
innocent, but because he was unaware that entering a guilty plea was the equivalent
of signing his death warrant.456 As Boykin’s lawyers wrote in his appellate brief,
“Why would anyone plead guilty to a capital offense except as a matter of trial

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Halbert, 545 U.S. at 629 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
People v. Bulger, 614 N.W.2d 103 (Mich. 2000).
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
Id. at 267.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239 (1969).
Id. at 243–44.
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strategy (for example, pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor not to seek the
death penalty)?”457
Second, in Henderson v. Morgan, Timothy Morgan was a “retarded” seventh
grader who was committed to a school for mental defectives before being released
to work on a farm.458 Morgan later had an argument with his boss, who threatened
to return him to state custody.459 Later that night, Morgan entered his boss’s
“bedroom with a knife, intending to collect his earned wages before leaving; she
awoke, began to scream, and he stabbed her.”460 Morgan was charged with
first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to second-degree murder pursuant to a plea
agreement.461 Subsequently, Morgan successfully appealed, claiming that his plea
was involuntary because he did not realize that second-degree murder requires
proof of intent.462
There are clear constitutional reasons why both of these defendants should
have been allowed to appeal, which is why the Halbert Court held that Michigan
could not deny defendants like Boykin and Morgan the right to appointed counsel.
But Justice Thomas was also right to find that appeals by these types of defendants
less important than appeals by defendants claiming they are actually innocent of any
criminal conduct.
As Justice Thomas also noted in Halbert, the second explanation for Michigan
making appeals by pleading defendants discretionary is because they are so rarely
meritorious.463 The aftermaths of both Boykin and Morgan illustrate why this was
the case. In Boykin, the Court held that due process requires that the court record
contain affirmative evidence that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently pleaded guilty.464 In the wake of Boykin, the federal government and
most states created mandatory rules covering a series of subjects that judges must
discuss with the defendant on the record to ensure that pleas are made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.465 As a result, Boykin-esque appeals are
rarely successful.466
Meanwhile, in Morgan, the Court noted that the record normally contains
references to the judge or defense counsel explaining the nature of the criminal
charge to the defendant.467 Further, the Court held that it could be appropriate to

457.
at *26–27.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
ed. 1993).
466.
467.

Brief for Petitioner, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (No. 642), 1968 WL 94352,
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 641 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 646–47.
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 630 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969).
See RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK § 5:18, at 425 (2d
Id.
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. at 647.
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presume in most cases that defense counsel sufficiently explained the nature of the
charge to the defendant.468 But, because the district court explicitly found that
neither the judge nor defense counsel had properly advised Morgan, the Court
concluded that his plea was involuntary under the Due Process Clause.469 In most
cases, however, the presumption that the defendant was aware of the nature of the
crime leads to the finding that his plea was voluntary.470
3. Reasoned Distinctions Do Not Make Sense in the Actual Innocence Context
Unlike the direct appeals by pleading defendants in Halbert, post-conviction
actual innocence claims are: (1) by definition about actual innocence, and
(2) frequently successful. The first part of this analysis is clear. When any defendant,
including a pleading defendant, brings a petition for writ of actual innocence or a
petition for post-conviction DNA testing, the defendant is claiming that he has or
is seeking evidence that could prove his actual innocence.471 Therefore,
post-conviction actual innocence claims by pleading defendants and non-pleading
defendants are not substantively different and are always about actual innocence.
The second part of this analysis is established by empirical evidence. Historical
data establishes that “[r]oughly 42 percent of the post-conviction DNA tests
requested by the Innocence Project confirmed guilt, 43 percent proved the
defendant’s innocence, and 15 percent were inconclusive.”472 Thus, while the direct
appeals challenging guilty pleas in Halbert were rarely successful, DNA appeals have
been successful more than forty percent of the time. There is not any comparable
data for the rate of success for claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA
evidence, but empirical data reveals that most exonerations are not based on DNA
evidence. As of 2016, there were 1994 exonerations in the DNA era, with only 442
(22.17%) of those exonerations based in whole or in part on DNA evidence.473
Therefore, 1552 exonerations (77.83%) have been based on non-DNA evidence.474
In 2016, just 10% of exonerations were based on DNA evidence while 90% of
exonerations were based on non-DNA evidence.475
Importantly, in recent years, there have been nearly as many DNA and
non-DNA exonerations for defendants who pleaded guilty as defendants convicted

468. Id.
469. Id. at 646–47.
470. See, e.g., Oppel v. Meachum, 851 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988).
471. See generally Brooks & Simpson, supra note 16.
472. Christie Thompson, Out of Prison, Out of Luck, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 27, 2015,
12:25 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/27/out-of-prison-out-of-luck [ https://
perma.cc/MSV6-56W9 ]. The DNA testing in the 42% of cases in which guilt is confirmed also seems
valuable because it forecloses future appeals by the defendant, which can conserve judicial resources
and bring additional finality. Cf. Osborne III, 521 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a right to
post-conviction DNA testing because it could confirm guilt or innocence).
473. EXONERATIONS IN 2016, supra note 14, at 5.
474. Id.
475. Id.
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after trials. In 2015, 65 out of 149 (43.6%) exonerees had been convicted after guilty
pleas;476 the following year, 74 out of 166 (44.6%) exonerees had previously pleaded
guilty.477 It is also likely that both of these numbers would have been higher were it
not for the pleading defendant prohibitions that exist in several states. Overall, then,
neither of the rationales for the “reasonable distinction” between pleading and
non-pleading defendants in Halbert apply in the actual innocence context.
4. A Limitation and Possible New Dimension of a Right to Prove Innocence After
Pleading Guilty
In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that states are under no federal
constitutional obligation to provide a right to appellate review.478 It is only after a
state creates a right to appellate review that the right to access the courts is
triggered.479 Therefore, because every state has a post-conviction DNA testing
statute,480 defendants across the country can use a Halbert-esque analysis to claim a
right to seek DNA testing after pleading guilty because they are similarly situated to
non-pleading defendants who have such a right.
As noted, however, while some states allow defendants to bring freestanding
claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence, other states do not.481 A
pleading defendant like Missourian Rodney Lincoln thus could not use a
Halbert-esque analysis to establish a right to prove his actual innocence through
non-DNA evidence because non-pleading defendants lack such a right
in Missouri.482
In states like Missouri, the question then becomes whether defendants with
non-DNA evidence of actual innocence can rely on post-conviction DNA statutes
to argue for a right to prove innocence after pleading guilty. As noted, to invoke the
right to access the courts, a defendant must establish that he was denied an avenue
of relief that was provided to similarly situated individuals.483 So, are defendants
with non-DNA evidence of actual innocence similarly situated to defendants who
have (or are seeking) DNA evidence of actual innocence? It seems evident that in
certain cases the answer to this question will be “no.” In the aforementioned case
of Ohioan Rachel Stull, her alleged polygraph evidence of actual innocence clearly

476. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 2 (2016),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/5PRP-3NZA ].
477. EXONERATIONS IN 2016, supra note 14, at 2.
478. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
479. Id.
480. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
482. See Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); see also supra notes 256–61.
483. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S 600, 604 (1974); see also supra text accompanying
notes 309–17.
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did not make her similarly situated to a convicted defendant with DNA evidence
clearly indicating that an alternate suspect committed the crime.484
There are other cases, however, in which a defendant with non-DNA evidence
would have a plausible claim that they are similarly situated to a defendant with
DNA evidence. Imagine three cases in which an African American defendant is
charged with robbing a bank, and (1) non-DNA forensic evidence, like a latent
fingerprint lifted from the gun used in the crime, is a “match” for an alternate
suspect with several robbery convictions; (2) surveillance footage from the robbery
shows that the robber was Caucasian; or (3) an alternate suspect confesses to the
crime and marked bills from the robbery are found in his house. In any of these
cases, the defendant would seem to have a good argument that they are similarly
situated to a convicted burglar with exculpatory DNA evidence recovered from a
window that may or may not have been used by the burglar.485
It is beyond the scope of this article to argue whether the defendant in any of
these three cases would have a viable claim under the right to access the courts. But
it is important to note that while this right to access the courts might leave some
defendants without a right to prove innocence after pleading guilty, it could also
potentially provide an avenue for relief for both pleading and non-pleading
defendants in states like Missouri.
CONCLUSION
In 2015 and 2016, a total of 139 out of 315 (44.1%) DNA and non-DNA
exonerees had been convicted after guilty pleas.486 Nonetheless, a number of states
have pleading defendant prohibitions in their post-conviction statutes that preclude
defendants who pleaded guilty from (1) seeking DNA testing, and/or (2) presenting
freestanding claims of actual innocence based on non-DNA evidence. While
existing constitutional challenges to these statutes have proved ineffective, the right
to access the courts provides the foundation and framework for a right to prove
innocence after pleading guilty. Based upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Michigan v. Halbert, there is a compelling claim that states cannot allow non-pleading
defendants to prove their actual innocence while completely foreclosing this avenue
of relief to pleading defendants. Instead, courts should recognize a right to prove
innocence after pleading guilty so that defendants across the country have the same
right to seek and present evidence of actual innocence.

484. See State v. Stull, No. 27036, 2014 WL 1345303 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014); see also supra
text accompanying notes 290–91.
485. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 468–69 and accompanying text.
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